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“In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice, but in practice there is.”
Johannes L. A. van de Snepscheut and Yogi Berra

vAbstract
Leonardo Chiarello
Security Evaluation of GNSS Signal Quality Monitoring
Techniques against Optimal Spoofing Attacks
GNSS-dependent positioning, navigation, and timing synchronization procedures
have a significant impact on everyday life. Therefore, such a widely used system
increasingly becomes an attractive target for illicit exploitation by terrorists and
hackers for various motives. As such, spoofing and anti-spoofing algorithms have
become an important research topic within the GNSS discipline. This Thesis provides
a review of recent research in the field of GNSS spoofing/anti-spoofing, designs a
method to generate an energy optimal spoofing signal and evaluates the performance
of the anti-spoofing signal quality monitoring techniques against it.
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Introduction
As technological advances are introduced in society and their use spreads among the
people, more and more applications are found for each technology. Global navigation
satellite system (GNSS) technology is a clear example of this phenomenon. Ever since
the global positioning system (GPS) became operational, its applications and use
have increased dramatically. Nowadays, almost every person has a device with them,
capable of guiding them through the ever-changing cities by means of GNSS signals.
Additionally, these devices are supported by infrastructures that are synchronized
thanks to these GNSS signals. Many other examples can be found to understand how
ubiquitous GNSSs are in everyday activities.
Technology evolves and spreads, and the concerns for security in all electronic and
telecommunication systems increase as well. This concern applies to many different
sectors of today’s society, one of them being GNSS. As can be seen, modern society
strongly relies on GNSS, for a constantly increasing number of applications and
services. However, the issues related to the security of such systems are sometimes
underestimated. This is the case of some services relying on GNSS civil signals. In
fact, the menace of intentional radio-frequency interference, such as jamming or
spoofing attacks, is gaining momentum, and discussions are being held, trying to find
ways to protect GNSS civil users from these attacks.
Nowadays, the effects of these intentional interferences, which are able to com-
promise the correct functioning of the GNSS receivers are well known [1]–[5], and
the need for improving the security of the receiver has been demonstrated [6], [7],
especially in case of applications whose malfunctioning would put people’s safety at
risk.
Among the different interference attacks that can affect GNSSs, one of the most
dangerous is the spoofing attack. It consists of the transmission of GNSS-like signals,
aligned with the satellite signals, with the goal of taking control of the position-
velocity-time (PVT) solution that the receiver computes. In this way, the attacker is
able to fake the target position without being noticed and may cause severe damage
to the applications relying on the GNSS signal.
Several spoofing countermeasure techniques have been proposed in the open
literature and they can be generally divided into twomain categories, namely spoofing
detection and spoofing mitigation [8], [9]. Spoofing detection algorithms concentrate
on detecting the presence of spoofing attack while spoofing mitigation techniques
aim to neutralize the spoofing threat and help the target GNSS receiver to recover
its positioning capability. Spoofing countermeasures can take place at any of the
operational layers of a GNSS receiver, namely at the signal processing level, data bit
level and/or position solution and navigation level [10].
Spoofing countermeasure methods look for specific features of spoofing signals
that make them different from the authentic ones. Some of the previously proposed
countermeasure techniques can be enumerated as received signal strength (RSS)
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monitoring, received signal time of arrival (TOA) monitoring, spatial coherency
analysis of received GNSS signals, signal quality monitoring (SQM), cryptographic
authentication, receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) and consistency
check among different sensors and constellations [11]–[14].
In this context, the contribute of this Thesis is to provide a performance evaluation
of the SMQ techniques against a proposed attack, that is optimal in the sense of energy
used by the attacker. The Thesis is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 provides a brief description of the existing GNSS systems, followed
by a brief description of their general architecture; then, a delineation of the
structure of the GNSS signals emitted by a satellite is presented, succeed by a
characterization of the the building blocks of a typical GNSS receiver, that is
antennas, front end, baseband processing and application processing.
• Chapter 3 presents the general model of a spoofing attack, the spoofing gener-
ation techniques and receiver state vulnerability to spoofing are investigated;
finally different cases of spoofing attacks are illustrated.
• Chapter 4 reviews different detection and mitigation spoofing countermeasures,
restricting the whole set of techniques to those that operate in the signal
processing level of the receiver.
• Chapter 5 describes the signal quality monitoring techniques and illustrates the
functioning of the nulling attack and of the proposed optimal spoofing attack.
• Chapter 6 outlines the simulation scenario, presents figures and comments the
results obtained.
• Finally, Chapter 7 draws some conclusions and suggests possible future research
topics that will continue the work of this Thesis.
3Chapter 2
An Introduction to GNSS
As the years pass by, the GNSSs are becoming an invisible technology, used by a
big portion of the society, but one that is not fully understood by the typical user.
As a consequence, the innovative uses and the possible threats to GNSSs are also
unknown. The United States (U.S.) GPS has been around for more than 20 years now,
and people have adopted the use of navigation systems in everyday life, to the point
where paper maps are becoming obsolete and everyone owns a GNSS receiver in
some form. Knowledge of the basic operation of GNSS, and understanding of its
limitations and risk, should be an important topic for the general user.
The goal of this Chapter is to present a condensed and brief summary on the GNSS
functional basics and to introduce the knowledge needed to follow the discussions
presented throughout this report. This Chapter is based mainly on the analysis done
in [15], [16].
2.1 GNSS Systems
In this section we introduce the major GNSS systems available at the time of writing
and their status.
GPS The GPS is the U.S. GNSS which provides free positioning and timing services
worldwide. GPS receivers compute their position in the GPS Reference System using
satellite technology and based on triangulation principles. Originally developed
for the U.S. military, the incident with the Korean Air Lines Flight 007 led the US
Government to decide to make GPS use free for civilian purposes very early in the
experimental phase of GPS. The launch of the first Block I Navstar GPS satellite meant
the beginning of the deployment of the GPS system on 22 February 1978, followed
by the declaration of the Initial Operating Capability in December 1993 with 24
operational satellites in orbit, and the Full Operational Capability in June 1995. GPS is
maintained by the United States government and is freely accessible by anyone with a
GPS receiver. The Department of Defense is responsible for operating the system, but
it also receives national-level attention and guidance through the National Executive
Committee for space-based positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT).
Two services are available in the current GPS system:
• The standard positioning service (SPS) is a positioning and timing service
available to all GPS users.
• The precise positioning service (PPS) is highly accurate positioning, velocity and
timing service restricted by cryptographic techniques to military and authorized
users.
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Galileo The Galileo program is Europe’s initiative for a state-of-the-art global satel-
lite navigation system, providing a highly accurate, guaranteed global positioning
service under civilian control. While providing autonomous navigation and posi-
tioning services, Galileo will be interoperable with other GNSS systems such as GPS
and GLONASS. In full operational capability (FOC) phase, the system will consist
of 30 satellites, to be deployed in a staggered approach, and the associated ground
infrastructure.
The services that are planned to be provided by Galileo are the following:
• The open service (OS) provides position and timing information, free of user
charge, that competes in performance with other GNSS systems.
• The commercial service (CS) improves accuracy and higher data throughput
with a user fee.
• Thepublic regulated service (PRS)providesnavigation and timing for authorized
users, with high continuity and accuracy.
• The search and rescue service (SAR) broadcasts globally alerts and distress
signals received by the satellite and communicates back an acknowledgment
signal.
• The safety-of-life (SoL) Service consists of an augmentation signal to the OS
intended for most transport safety critical applications.
GLONASS The Russian GNSS, called GLONASS, has been operational since 1993
and achieved optimal status in 1995 with 24 satellites. Following completion, the
system fell into disrepair with the collapse of the Russian economy and the reduction
in funding for space industry. Since year 2000, the Russian government has been
working for the restoration of the system, updating their satellites and designing
modern signals to be broadcast. In October 2011, the full orbital constellation of
24 satellites was restored, enabling full global coverage and providing Standard
Positioning Service and Precise Positioning Service similar to GPS.
BeiDou The BeiDou navigation satellite system (BDS) is China’s second-generation
satellite navigation system that will be capable of providing positioning, navigation,
and timing services to users on a continuous worldwide basis. Although the evolution
of its regional navigation system towards a global solution started in 1997, the formal
approval by the Government of the development and deployment of BDS System was
done in 2006 and it is expected to provide global navigation services by 2020.
The BeiDou supports both global worldwide services and regional services. The
global services are the Open Service and the Authorized Service, which are similar to,
respectively, SPS and PPS of GPS. The regional services can be further sub-divided in
two other services: the Wide Area Differential Service consists of an augmentation
signal to reach one meter positioning accuracy and the Short Message Service consists
in allowing the user and the station to exchange short messages.
2.2 GNSS Segments
This Section provides a brief overview of the main components of a GNSS system.
As illustrated in Fig. 2.1, a GNSS basically consists of three main segments: the
space segment, which comprises the satellites; the control segment (also referred to as
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Figure 2.1: GNSS architecture. From [15].
the ground segment), which is responsible for the proper operation of the system; and
the user segment, which includes the GNSS receivers providing positioning, velocity
and precise timing to users.
Space Segment The main functions of the space segment are to generate and
transmit code and carrier phase signals, and to store and broadcast the navigation
message uploaded by the control segment. These transmissions are controlled by
highly stable atomic clocks onboard the satellites.
The GNSS space segments are formed by satellite constellations with enough satellites
to ensure that users will have at least four satellites in view simultaneously from any
point on Earth’s surface at any time.
Control Segment The control segment (also referred to as the ground segment) is
responsible for the proper operation of the GNSS. Its basic functions are:
• to control and maintain the status and configuration of the satellite constellation;
• to predict ephemeris and satellite clock evolution;
• to keep the corresponding GNSS time scale (through atomic clocks); and
• to update the navigation messages for all the satellites.
User Segment The user segment is composed of GNSS receivers. Their main
function is to receive GNSS signals, determine pseudoranges (and other observables)
and solve the navigation equations in order to obtain the coordinates and provide a
very accurate time.
The basic elements of a generic GNSS receiver are: an antenna with preamplification,
a radio frequency section, a microprocessor, an intermediate-precision oscillator, a
feeding source, some memory for data storage and an interface with the user. The
calculated position is referred to the antenna phase centre.
2.3 GNSS Signals
In this Section we present the basic structure of the GNSS signals and describe briefly
their different components and characteristics.
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Figure 2.2: Composition of the navigation satellite signal. From [17].
Signal structure GNSS satellites continuously transmit navigation signals at two or
more frequencies in L band. These signals contain ranging codes and navigation data
to allow users to compute both the travel time from the satellite to the receiver and
the satellite coordinates at any epoch. The main signal components are described as
follows:
• Carrier: radio frequency (RF) sinusoidal signal at a given frequency fRF.
• Ranging code, C¹tº: sequences of zeros and ones which allow the receiver to
determine the travel time of the radio signal from the satellite to the receiver.
They are called pseudorandom noise (PRN) sequences or PRN codes.
• Navigation data, D¹tº: a binary-coded message providing information on
the satellite ephemeris (pseudo-Keplerian elements or satellite position and
velocity), clock bias parameters, almanac (with a reduced-accuracy ephemeris
data set), satellite health status and other complementary information.
Therefore, a generic unmodulated GNSS signal emitted by a satellite, denoted as
signal in space (SIS), can be written as:
s¹tº  p2PC¹tºD¹tº cos(2 fRFt + 0) ; (2.1)
where P is the average power of the sinusoidal signal and 0 is the initial phase. In
Fig. 2.2 is represented an example of carrier, code and data signals together with the
resulting SIS.
Frequency allocation The allocation of frequency bands is a complex process
because multiple services and users can fall within the same range. That is, the
same frequencies can be allocated for different purposes in different countries. The
international telecommunication union (ITU) is a United Nations agency coordinating
the shared global use of the radio spectrum. It involves, for instance, television, radio,
cell (mobile) phone, radar satellite broadcasting, etc., and even microwave ovens. The
ITU divides the electromagnetic spectrum into frequency bands, with different radio
services assigned to particular bands.
Figure 2.3 shows the frequency bands for the radionavigation satellite service (RNSS),
that is a radiodetermination-satellite service used for the purpose of radionavigation,
and for the aeronautical radionavigation service (ARNS), which is a radionavigation
service intended for the benefit and for the SoL applications.
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Figure 2.3: GPS, Glonass, Galileo and Beidou navigational frequency
bands. From [15].
2.3.1 GPS Signals
Legacy GPS signals are transmitted on two radio frequencies in the L band, referred to
as Link 1 (L1) and Link 2 (L2). They are right-hand circularly polarized (RHCP) and
their center frequencies are derived from a fundamental frequency f0  10:23 MHz,
generated by onboard atomic clocks: fL1  154  10:23 MHz  1575:420 MHz and
fL2  120  10:23 MHz  1227:600 MHz.
The GPS uses the code division multiple access (CDMA) technique to send different
signals on the same radio frequency, and the modulation method used is binary phase
shift keying (BPSK).
The following types of PRN codes are modulated over the two carriers:
• Coarse/Acquisition (C/A) code, also known as civilian code C¹tº: this sequence
contains 1023 bits and is repeated every millisecond (i.e., a chip rate of Rc 
1:023 Mbps). Then, the duration of each C/A code chip is Tc  1 s, which
means a chip width or wavelength of 293:1 m. This code is modulated only on
L1. The C/A code defines the SPS.
• Precision code, P¹tº: This is reserved for military use and authorized civilian
users. The sequence is repeated every 266 days (38 weeks) and a weekly portion
of this code is assigned to every satellite. Its chip rate is 10 Mbps, which leads
to a wavelength of 29:31 m. This code defines the PPS.
In order to protect military receivers against an adversary transmitting a faulty
copy of the GPS signal to mislead the receiver, and to deny access of non
authorized users to the precise ranging code P, the latter is encrypted by
combining it with a secret W code (called security code), resulting in the Y code,
which is modulated over the two carriers L1 and L2.
The resulting SIS emitted by a satellite takes the following form (see Fig. 2.4):
s¹tº  sL1¹tº + sL2¹tº ; (2.2)
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Figure 2.4: Legacy GPS signal structure. From [15].
where
sL1¹tº 
√
2PP;1W¹tºP¹tºD¹tº sin(2 fL1t + L1) +√2PCC¹tºD¹tº cos(2 fL1t + L1) ;
(2.3)
sL2¹tº 
√
2PP;2W¹tºP¹tºD¹tº sin(2 fL2t + L2) : (2.4)
Finally, Table 2.1 contains a summary of the current GPS signals, frequencies and
applied modulations. The ranging code rate and data rate are also given in the table.
Navigation message Every satellite receives from the ground antennas the nav-
igation data, which are sent back to users through the navigation message. The
navigation message contains all the necessary information to allow users to perform
the positioning service. This includes the ephemeris parameters, needed to compute
the satellite coordinates with sufficient accuracy, the time parameters and clock
corrections, needed to compute satellite clock offsets and time conversions, the service
parameters with satellite health information, the ionospheric parameters model,
needed for single-frequency receivers, and the almanacs, allowing computation of
the position of “all satellites in the constellation”, with a reduced accuracy, which
is needed for acquisition of the signal by the receiver. The ephemeris and clock
parameters are usually updated every two hours, while the almanac is updated at
least every six days.
Table 2.1: Current GPS navigation signals. From [15].
Link Carrier freq.(MHz) PRN code Modulation type
Code rate
(Mcps)
Data rate
(bps) Service
L1 1575.420
C/A BPSK(1) 1.023 50 Civil
P BPSK(10) 10.23 50 Military
L2 1227.600 P BPSK(10) 10.23 50 Military
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Table 2.2: Galileo navigation signals. The PRN codes relative to PRS
signals are encrypted. The two signals located in the E5a and E5b
bands respectively are modulated onto a single E5 carrier frequency of
1191:795 MHz using the AltBOC technique: AltBOC(15,10). From [15].
Link Carrier freq.(MHz)
Signal and
channel Modulation type
Code rate
(Mcps)
Data rate
(bps) Services
E1 1575.420
E1-A data BOCcos(15,2.5) 2.5575 N/A PRS
E1-B data
MBOC(6,1,1/11) 1.023
125 OS, CS,
SoLE1-C pilot –
E6 1278.750
E6-A data BOCcos(10,5)
2.5575
N/A PRS
E6-B data
BPSK(5)
500
CS
E6-C pilot –
E5a 1176.450
E5a-I data
BPSK(10) 10.23
25
OS
E5a-Q pilot –
E5b 1207.140
E5b-I data
BPSK(10) 10.23
125 OS, CS,
SoLE5b-Q pilot –
As, anticipated, the current “legacy” navigation message (NAV) is modulated on
both carriers at 50 bps. The whole message contains 25 pages (or “frames”) of 30 s
each, forming the master frame that takes 12:5 min to be transmitted. Every frame
is subdivided into five subframes of 6 s each; in turn, every subframe consists of 10
words, with 30 bits per word. A full description of the GPS message structure can be
found in [15].
GPS Signal Modernization The goal of modernization for the civil service is to
improve accuracy, availability, coverage, integrity and robustness. In order to do so,
modernization has introduced new civil signals (L2C, L5 andL1C) and frequencies (L5)
in order to provide the user with increased redundancy, possibilities for ionospheric
corrections and higher accuracy.
2.3.2 Galileo Signals
In FOCphase, eachGalileo satellite will transmit 10 navigation signals in the frequency
bands E1, E6, E5a and E5b, each right-hand circularly polarized. These signals can
contain data and pilot channels. Both channels provide ranging codes, but the data
channels also include navigation data. Pilot channels are data-less signals, so no bit
transition occurs, thus helping the tracking of weak signals.
As in GPS, all satellites share the same frequencies, and the signals are differentiated
by the CDMA technique, while the modulation methods used are BPSK and binary
offset carrier (BOC) (and a couple of its variants), depending on the signal component.
A summary of Galileo signals, frequencies and applied modulations is presented
in Table 2.2. The ranging code rate and data rate are also given in the table.
Navigation message The Galileo satellites will broadcast five types of data in four
navigation messages: the freely accessible navigation message (F/NAV), similar to the
NAV of GPS, the integrity navigation message (I/NAV), the commercial navigation
message (C/NAV) and the governmental navigation message (G/NAV).
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Figure 2.5: Power spectral density of a BOC(1,1) and BPSK-modulated
signals. From [18].
The complete navigation message is transmitted on each data channel as a sequence of
frames. A frame comprises a certain number of subframes, and a subframe comprises
several pages. A full description of the Galileo message structure can be found in [15].
BOC modulation The BOC modulation consists in multiplying the PRN code of
chip rate Rc  m  1:023 Mcps with a rectangular sub-carrier of frequency fs 
n  1:023 MHz. The BOC signal is referred to as BOC( fs ,Rc) or, for simplicity,
BOC(n,m).
The main idea behind BOC modulation is to reduce the interference with BPSK-
modulated signals, which has a sinc function shaped spectrum. Indeed, BPSK-
modulated signals have most of their spectral energy concentrated around the
carrier frequency, while BOC-modulated signals have low energy around the carrier
frequency and two main spectral lobes further away from the carrier and, more
precisely, centered at frequencies fRF  nRc . As an example, Fig. 2.5 shows the PSD of
a BPSK signal against the PSD of a BOC(1,1) signal.
The BOC modulation has several variants and, as can be seen in Table 2.2, those
selected for Galileo are BOCsin, BOCcos, MBOC and AltBOC.
2.4 GNSS Receivers
In this Section a brief explanation of the functionality of a GNSS receiver is provided
and the general GNSS receiver architecture is described.
GNSS receivers are responsible for processing the L-band SIS coming from the
GNSS satellites in order to determine the user position, velocity, and precise time.
Most GNSS receivers have a similar block diagram, although some architecture
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Figure 2.6: Generic receiver architecture. From [18].
variations might be present to accommodate different solutions. The basic building
blocks of a generic GNSS receiver are as shown in Fig. 2.6.
2.4.1 Antennas
GNSS antennas are RHCP and aim at capturing GNSS signals in the L-band, with the
associated amplification and filtering. It is the entry point from the space segment
to the user segment, as it receives the L-band signals to pre-process and feed as an
analog electrical signal to the front end.
When designing a GNSS antenna, the main objective is to maximize the antenna gain
towards emitting satellites above a given elevation angle, while rejecting multipath
signals (usually at lower elevation angles) and interference. The design of the
antenna has to cope with the environmental conditions of the target application, while
respecting mobility, power and size constraints. Usually GNSS antennas present
hemispherical radiation patterns that can reject multipath coming from low elevation
angles.
As far as interference is concerned, antenna arrays can be used to modify the radiation
pattern so as to reject signals coming from the direction of the interferer. In addition,
beam steering techniques are often employed to “follow” the signal from a given
satellite with maximum gain.
From Eq. (2.1), the received signal for a visible satellites at the end of a receiver
antenna can be modeled as
rRF¹tº  a
p
2PD¹t   tpºC¹t   º cos
[
2¹ fRF + fDº¹t   tpº + 0
]
+ nRF¹tº (2.5)
with
fD    fRFc
dtp
dt ; (2.6)
where a is the path attenuation, tp is the propagation time,  is the propagation time
modulo the code period, denoted as code delay, fD is the carrier Doppler frequency
shift (Hz) and nRF¹tº is the additive noise component at RF. In order to simplify the
notation, Eq. (2.5) can be rewritten as
rRF¹tº  AD¹t   tpºC¹t   º cos
[
2¹ fRF + fDºt + 
]
+ nRF¹tº ; (2.7)
where A is the signal amplitude taking into account the signal power as well as the
attenuation factor and   0   2¹ fIF + fDºtp is the carrier phase offset in addition
to the Doppler shift.
2.4.2 Front End
The GNSS signal captured through the receiver’s antenna is fed to the front end
section. The front end is then responsible for “preparing” the received signals for
signal processing tasks, and many different implementations can achieve the desired
results. As always, some requirement and trade-off analysis is neededwhen designing
a front-end for GNSS receivers, depending on the application at hand. Figure 2.7
illustrates a typical front end structure in GNSS receivers.
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Figure 2.7: Example of GNSS receiver’s front end structure. From [15].
The frequency synthesizer provides the receiver with time and frequency reference
for all the front end components. Such components, at front end architecture level,
gather typical interconnected steps to process and convert a RF signal to a baseband
digital signal:
• Filtering and amplification: these stages are necessary to ensure low noise and
out-of-band rejection in the received signals, as well as amplification stages to
compensate for transmission losses.
• Down-conversion: the front end is responsible for down-converting the input
signal from RF to intermediate frequency (IF). This is achieved through signal
mixing operations which consist in mixing two different frequency signals in
order to shift the same information at two different frequencies, where one is
the sum of the two frequencies mixed, and the other is their difference. The
basis of the mixing process is the local oscillator (LO), which must be carefully
chosen to avoid harmonics and image frequencies near IF.
• Quantization: the incoming signals are digitized through analog to digital
converters (ADC), ensuring that quantization errors and dynamic ranges are
appropriate to accommodate the signal’s characteristics.
• Automatic Gain Control: the automatic gain control (AGC) stage is closely
related to the downconversion and quantization steps, and is responsible for
adjusting the gain of the front end section in order to take benefit from the full
dynamic range.
From Eq. (2.5), the signal at the end of the front end for a single satellite can be
modeled as
rIF¹kº  AD¹kTs   tpºC¹kTs   º cos
[
2¹ fIF + fDºkTs + 
]
+ nIF¹tº for k  0; 1; 2; : : : ; (2.8)
whereTs is the sampling time interval (s) such that t  kTs and nIF is the corresponding
noise at IF.
2.4.3 Baseband signal processing
The baseband processing block is responsible for processing the down-converted
and digitized GNSS signal in order to provide observables: code pseudoranges and
carrier phase measurements, as well as navigation data.
In most GNSS receivers’ architectures, the baseband processing relies on independent
channels that track each satellite signal autonomously. Then, the information from
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Figure 2.8: Block diagram of internal functions in a generic baseband
processing block. From [16].
each channel is integrated to derive a navigation solution. Figure 2.8 shows the main
components of the baseband processing block.
Receiver Correlator Model In order to detect and track the GNSS signals, the
receiver employs the auto-correlation principle. It generates a transmitted GNSS
signal copy of a single satellite inside the receiver and correlates this replica signal
with the received signal. If the signal parameters in terms of code phase and Doppler
shift match reasonably well, the correlation value increases. The correlation is realized
as an integration of the product of received and replica signal.
The received signal at the front-end output for a single satellite can be modeled as
r¹k; ; ; fD ;Aº  AD¹kTs   ºC¹kTs   ºe j»2¹ fIF+ fDºkTs+¼
+ n¹kTsº for k  0; 1; 2; : : : ;
(2.9)
where
n¹kTsº  CN (0; 2n ) ; (2.10)
is the complex additive Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance 2n (see Ap-
pendix A for the relation between 2n and CN0). Moreover, Ts is the sampling time
interval, fIF is the IF at which the signal is down-converted by the front end, D is the
navigation data symbol sequence and C is the spreading code sequence with a chip
duration of Tc . Finally, A is the signal amplitude,  is the code delay, fD is the carrier
Doppler frequency shift and  is the carrier-phase delay. For the sake of simplicity,
the dependency of the various functions on ; ; fD and A will be dropped.
Assuming the navigation data bit does not change in the integration time interval,
the locally generated replica signal component of a visible GNSS satellite at the IF,
without the use of amplitude and navigation data bit, can be modeled as
ÆrIF¹kº  C¹kTs   Æºe j»2¹ fIF+ ÆfDºkTs+ Æ¼ : (2.11)
14 Chapter 2. An Introduction to GNSS
The correlation operation is given by
corr »r¹kº; Ær¹kº¼  1
M
MÕ
k1
r¹kº Ær¹kº ; (2.12)
where corr¹x ; yº is the correlation function of x and y andM is the number of samples
within the coherent integration time Tcoh  MTs, which is usually shorter or equal to
the navigation data bit period.
From the computations in [16], the correlator output, also called cross ambiguity
function (CAF), can be written as
S  ADR¹º sinc ¹ fDTcohºe j¹+ fDTcohº +  (2.13)
where
  CN
(
0; 2
)
; (2.14)
is the noise after the correlation operation,      Æ is the code delay error,
     Æ is the carrier phase error,  fD  fD   ÆfD is the Doppler error and R¹º
is the normalized autocorrelation function (ACF) of C¹kTsº at lag . In Eq. (2.13)
the sinc function is defined as sinc¹xº  sin¹xº¹xº. The in-phase and quadrature
components of the CAF are given by
I  ADR¹º sinc¹ fDTcohº cos
(
 +  fDTcoh
)
+ I ; (2.15)
Q  ADR¹º sinc¹ fDTcohº sin
(
 +  fDTcoh
)
+ Q ; (2.16)
where I and Q represent the noise in I and Q respectively.
Finally, it is useful to specify the notation
S  ADR¹  º sinc ¹ fDTcohºe j +   I + jQ ; (2.17)
to indicate the output of a particular correlator whose delay is  chips from the
prompt one, that is
Ær¹kº  C¹kTs   Æ  ºe j»2¹ fIF+ ÆfDºkTs+ Æ¼ : (2.18)
Using this notation, we can define the prompt correlator as SP  S0. Moreover,
correlators with   are called early correlators, while those with + are called late
correlators; if an early and a late correlator have the same , their distance in chips is
called early-late spacing d  2.
In order to clarify the concept of ACF, a pair of examples (in particular, for the two
code signals that will be used for testing the signal quality monitoring [SQM] metrics)
are reported:
• BPSK(1) signal. The ACF of a BPSK(1) signal, like the GPS C/A code signal,
takes the approximative form
R¹º 
{
1   j jTc for j j  Tc ;
0 for j j > Tc ; (2.19)
that is represented in Fig. 2.9a.
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Figure 2.9: Normalized ACF of two differently modulated signals.
• BOC(1,1) signal. The ACF of a BOC(1,1) signal, whose alternative versions are
be adopted in some Galileo code signals, takes the approximative form
R¹º 

1   3j jTc for j j  Tc2 ;
 1 + j jTc for Tc2 < j j  Tc ;
0 for j j > Tc ;
(2.20)
that is represented in Fig. 2.9b.
Acquisition The goal of the acquisition stage is to identify which satellites are in
view and to obtain the code delay  and the Doppler frequency shift fD, for each
satellite signal present, so the tracking stage can refine these estimates and obtain an
accurate solution. The signal search can intuitively be seen as a numerical evaluation
of the signal’s correlation function in the two-dimensional Doppler and code phase
space. If the peak magnitude of this function exceeds a certain threshold, then the
signal is declared to be present and the position of the peak are the coarse estimates.
From a theoretical point of view, this picture can be translated in a generalized
maximum likelihood ratio test (GLRT).
In the theory of signal detection, signal acquisition has to decide which of the
following hypotheses is true:
H0: Considered satellite signal is not present
H1: Considered satellite signal is present.
The acquisition engine evaluates the total power
jS j2  A2R¹º2 sinc ¹ fDTº + noise  I2 +Q2 (2.21)
for a certain range of Doppler and code-phase values, searches the peak within this
area and compares the value of the peak against a threshold . If the peak exceeds
the threshold, the hypothesis H1 is declared to be true, otherwise H0. To increase the
sensitivity one can increase the coherent integration time T. Under the assumption
of a signal being present, the total power S assumes the shape of a peak like the
one shown in Fig. 2.10. A further sensitivity increase is achieved by a noncoherent
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integration; that is to compute the correlation function several ( ) times and to
average them:
Snc 
Õ
n1
jSn j2 ; (2.22)
where n denotes subsequent coherent integrations each over an interval of T. The
total integration time is Ttot  T.
Mathematically speaking, the function Snc is the sum of 2 squared zero-mean
Gaussian random variables (each coherent integration has a contribution from the
real I and the imaginary Q part) under the assumption H0, and Snc follows a central
chi-squared distribution with right-tail probability Q2;, where   2 are the
degrees of freedom. Therefore, the false alarm probability, that is the chance that the
receiver incorrectly detects a signal even if it is not present, is given by
Pfa  P¹Snc >  jH0º  Q2;2 : (2.23)
Under H1, the probability distribution of Snc is a noncentral chi-squared distribution
with right-tail probability Q2;;z and the noncentrality parameter z  2TCN0
relates to the carrier-to-noise ratio CN0 and the number of noncoherent integrations

Pd  P¹Snc >  jH1º  Q2;2;2TCN0 : (2.24)
The term P¹Snc >  jH1º is the detection probability, that is the ability of the receiver
to detect signals that are actually present. The threshold  can be found by setting
one of two probabilities of Eqs. (2.23) and (2.24) to the desired value.
Finally, the coarse estimation of code delay and Doppler frequency shift, for a given
satellite/PRN code, is given by
Æ ; Æf D  arg max
Æ; ÆfD
Snc ; (2.25)
where the search space Æ; ÆfD is usually discrete, as a sort of grid, that is Æ 2
f0; grid ; 2grid ; : : : ; Tcg and ÆfD 2 f  fd;max ;  fd;max+ fd;grid ; : : : ; fd;max  fd;grid ; fd;maxg,
where grid is the code resolution in chips, fd;max is the maximum reasonable Doppler
frequency shift and fd;grid is the frequency resolution in Hertz.
Tracking After the coarse estimate of initial code delay and carrier Doppler by
the acquisition block, the signal tracking is performed to obtain fine estimates of
signal parameters of interest. The core of the tracking stage are the tracking loops,
which are designated to adjust the input of the local replica signal generators to
match the received signals. There exists three tracking loops architectures: phase-
locked-loop (PLL) for carrier-phase tracking, frequency-locked-loop (FLL) for carrier
Doppler frequency shift tracking, and delay-locked-loop (DLL) for code delay tracking.
Figure 2.11 shows a high-level block diagram of a single-channel signal tracking
engine in typical digital GNSS receivers.
The operation of the signal tracking engine is as follows. The carriers in the digital
IF signal sequences are wiped off by the replica carrier signals to produce the I and Q
signal components. The replica carrier signals are synthesized by the carrier generator
using the carrier phase estimate generated by the PLL or the FLL.
The I and Q signal components are then correlated (i.e., mixed and integrated and
dumped) with the replica codes at early, prompt, and late branches (for the most
simple case of standard tracking of a BPSK signal). They are, similar to the previous
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Figure 2.10: Example of GPS C/A correlation function during signal
acquisition. From [16].
case, synthesized by the code generator with a 3 bit shift register using the code delay
estimate generated by the DLL. Normally, the correlator output at prompt branches
(IP, QP) is used in the carrier tracking whereas the correlator output at early and late
branches (IE, QE and IL, QL) are used in the code tracking.
After the correlation process there are the discriminators, which have the task to
extract the signal parameter error information from the correlator outputs I and Q at
the early, prompt, and late branches. The type of discriminator algorithm determines
the type of tracking loop (i.e., PLL, FLL or DLL):
• PLL and FLL Discriminators. The carrier loop discriminator determines
characteristics of the carrier tracking loop as a carrier-phase tracking loop
or a carrier Doppler tracking loop. The carrier-phase tracking loops are more
accurate but more sensitive to dynamic stress than the carrier Doppler tracking
loop.
For the carrier-phase tracking loop, there are mainly two types: a pure PLL
and a Costas PLL. The pure PLL is sensitive to the presence of bit/symbol
modulation on the signal. The Costas PLL is insensitive to that if the integration
time of the correlator to produce the baseband IP and QP does not straddle the
data bit/symbol transitions. Under the assumption of no noise in Eqs. (2.15)
and (2.16), the carrier-phase error can be obtained by
QP
IP

sin
(

)
cos
(

)  tan()   for   0 )   tan 1 (QP
IP
)
:
(2.26)
For pure PLLs, the arctangent in Eq. (2.26) is substituted by a four-quadrant
arctangent in order to remain linear over the full input error range of 180°,
whereas arctangent for Costas PLLs remains linear over half of the input error
range (90°).
For the carrier Doppler tracking loop, the Doppler error can be obtained by
 fD 
tan 1
(
IP;kQP;k+1 IP;k+1QP;k
IP;k IP;k+1+QP;kQP;k+1
)
T
; (2.27)
where k is used to index baseband samples and T is the coherent integration
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Figure 2.11: Block diagram of a GNSS signal tracking engine. From
[16].
time. Intrinsically, the FLL tracks the carrier frequency and not the carrier phase
so that the FLL discriminator is insensitive to 180° phase reversals but its
integration time must not straddle the navigation data bit/symbol transitions.
Beside the discriminators described before, there are several variants of PLL
and FLL discriminator algorithms that produce slightly different characteristics
in terms of optimality depending on signal-to-noise ratio, integration time and
computational complexity.
• DLL Discriminators. The DLL discriminator uses the early and late branches
rather than the prompt branch of the carrier loop. Figure 2.12 shows how the
early, prompt, and late correlators change as the offset of the locally generated
code replicas are advanced with respect to the incoming satellite’s code signal.
If the replica code is aligned, then the early and late branches are equal in
amplitude and no error is generated by the discriminator. If not, the early and
late samples are not equal by an amount proportional to the code offset. From
this idea can be derived the early-minus-late envelope discriminator:
 
1
2
E   L
E + L
; (2.28)
where E 
√
I2E +Q
2
E and L 
√
I2L +Q
2
L. Note that there are several variants
of DLL discriminator algorithms that produce slightly different characteristics
in terms of required coherent-noncoherent integrations, accuracy, availability
depending on the carrier-lock condition, correlator spacing and computational
complexity.
The DLL tracking becomes more fragile when considering BOC-modulated
ranging codes and their ambiguous discriminator function. There are different
concepts to avoid false tracking. One of them is to track only one sidelobe of
the BOC frequency spectrum, consequently neglecting half of the energy in
the signal. A method which takes full advantage of the BOC energy spectral
spreading is the bump and jump technique, relying on two more correlators, a
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Figure 2.12: Early-minus-late DLL discriminator. From [16].
very early and a very late correlator.
The discriminator outputs contain much noise that should be efficiently filtered out
by the loop filter. The output of the loop filter is the rate of change information of the
signal parameter of interest (i.e., Û, Û, ÛfD) which is then integrated in the numerically
controlled oscillator (NCO) to predict the signal parameter estimate (i.e., Æ, Æ, ÆfD) for
the next step. This signal parameter estimate is used in the local signal generator to
produce the estimated local replica signals for the correlation.
Time Synchronization and Data Demodulation While the tracking loops extract
code and carrier information to synchronize the locally generated PRN code with
the incoming signal, the synchronization, both at bit/symbol and frame level, and
data demodulation stage aims at extracting the navigation message to be used by the
applications processing block, when generating a navigation solution. The inputs
are the measurements from the tracking loops (code and carrier information), as
well as the sign of the prompt correlator outputs. In fact, when a signal is being
correctly tracked, the sign of the prompt correlator output is positive when the
transmitted navigation symbol is 1 and negative when the symbol is  1, by definition
of correlation.
GNSS Measurements At this point, the receiver is tracking the incoming signal
and has extracted the navigation message, and therefore can compute the observables,
namely pseudorange and Doppler frequency. Although Doppler frequency is quite
straight forward, and can be directly taken from the FLL or the instantaneous phase
measured at the PLL, the pseudorange still needs to be computed from the code delay
values provided by the DLL.
Considering a reference time scale T, the pseudorange to a given satellite can be
computed as:
R  c¹tr¹T2º   ts¹T1ºº (2.29)
where: c is the speed of light in a vacuum; tr¹T2º is the time of signal reception,
measured on the time scale given by the receiver clock T2; and ts¹T1º is the time of
signal transmission, measured on the time scale given by the satellite clock T1. In
particular ts¹T1º is extrapolated from sum of the time of the time stamp recorded by
the satellite at the beginning of each subframe, the number of navigation data bits
transmitted since the beginning of the subframe, the number of code periods since
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Figure 2.13: Positioning through intersecting spheres. From [16].
the beginning of the current navigation data bit, the number of chips elapsed in the
current code cycle and, finally, the code delay provided by the DLL.
2.4.4 Application Processing
The applications processing block extracts observables and navigation data from each
channel of the baseband processing block, and combines this information to satisfy
the requirements of a given application.
The most common raw information provided by a GNSS receiver is the PVT infor-
mation, but other information may still be used such as time and frequency transfer,
static and kinematic surveying, ionospheric parameters monitoring, differential GNSS
reference stations, GNSS signal integrity monitoring, etc.
PVT solution In order to calculate the user’s PVT solution there exist two methods:
single-frequency code-based positioning for standard point positioning (SPP) and
dual-frequency code and carrier-based for precise point positioning (PPP). Here it is
summarized the first one.
The aim is to determine the receiver coordinates r  ¹x; y; zº (using earth centered,
earth fixed (ECEF) coordinates) and clock offset t from pseudorange measurements
R of at least four satellites in view. Indeed, the positioning principle is based on
solving a trilateration problem where each satellite (with known coordinates) is the
center of a sphere with radius the measured pseudorange and the user position is the
point we want to find as intersection of the four (or more) spheres (see Fig. 2.13).
The pseudorange to a given satellite in Eq. (2.29) can be modeled as
R   + c¹dtr   dtsº + I + T + Kr + Ks + mp + n : (2.30)
Here  denotes the geometric distance between the receive antenna at the reception
epoch and the transmit antenna at the transmission epoch. Moreover, dts and dtr are
the satellite and receiver clock offsets with respect to the common system timescale,
I and T represent ionospheric and tropospheric path delays, Kr and Ks denote the
receiver and satellite instrumental delays, and the remaining terms describe various
forms of measurement errors. These include multipath errors (mp) and receiver noise
(n). A visual representation of the pseudorange measurement contents is given in
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Figure 2.14: Pseudorange measurement contents. From [15].
Fig. 2.14.
From the code pseudorange measurements R j for n  4 satellites, the following
measurement equation system can be written, neglecting the multipath and receiver
noise terms:
R j   D j 
√
¹x j   xº2 + ¹y j   yº2 + ¹z j   zº2 + ctr ; j  1; : : : ; n (2.31)
where the left-hand side contains the measurements R j and all modeled terms
D j   cts;j+ ION j +TRO j +Kr+Ks. The right-hand side contains the four unknown
parameters: the receiver coordinates ¹x; y; zº and the receiver clock offset t.
Equations 2.31 defines a nonlinear system, which can be solved by linearizing the
geometric range  in the a neighborhood of a point ¹x0 ; y0 ; z0º corresponding to the
approximate position of a receiver. Following the procedure in [15], we obtain a
linearized version of the system 2.31:
R j    j0   D j 
x0   x j

j
0
x +
y0   y j

j
0
y +
z0   z j

j
0
z + ct ; j  1; : : : ; n (2.32)
where  j0 
√¹x j   x0º2 + ¹y j   y0º2 + ¹z j   z0º2, x  x   x0, y  y   y0 and
z  z   z0. In general, this is an over-determined system, which can be solved
using the least squares adjustment. After solving it, the estimate of the receiver is
¹x ; y ; zº  ¹x0 + x ; y0 + y ; z0 + zº. Equations 2.31 can be linearized again about
these new estimates od the receiver’s position, and the solution can be iterated until
the change between two consecutive iterations is below a given threshold. Typically
the starting point is set to the Earth’s center, that is ¹x0 ; y0 ; z0º  ¹0; 0; 0º.
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The Spoofing Threat
Spoofing signals were considered a threat for military GNSS signals from the start;
however, due to the recent rapid increase in the application of civilianGNSSdependant
systems, motivation has increased to spoof these signals for illegal or concealed
transportation, fishing and hunting in prohibited areas, misleading receiver timing
being used by power distribution grids and cellular networks and interrupting stock
exchange transactions. Spoofing signals try to induce falsified timing and position
solution to their target receivers and they are designed to mimic different features
the authentic GNSS signals in order to prevent detection. The ubiquity of GNSS has
generated the motivation for spoofing attacks and generating this type of interference
has become more feasible and less costly thanks to the fact that the structure of most
civilian GNSS signals is known to the public and due to advances in software defined
radio (SDR) technology.
In this Chapter the general model of a spoofing attack is first described, then a
classification of the spoofing generation techniques is done followed by a receiver
state based analysis of spoofing and finally an overview the different types of spoofing
attacks and techniques is illustrated.
3.1 General Model of a Spoofing Attack
From Eq. (2.7), an authentic typical received GNSS signal takes the form
ra¹tº 
NaÕ
i1
Aa;iDa;i¹t   tp;a;iºCa;i¹t   a;iºe j»2¹ fRF+ fD;a;iºt+a;i¼ + na¹tº ; (3.1)
where the subscript ’a’ stands for “authentic” and Na is the number of the visible
satellites at the end of a receiver antenna and the other variables are as defined after
Eqs. (2.5) and (2.7).
In a spoofing attack, an attacker, called spoofer, wants to lead a tracking receiver to a
false PVT solution through a false GNSS signal, called spoofing signal. At the end of
a receiver antenna the malicious signal can be written in the form
rs¹tº 
NsÕ
i1
As;iDs;i¹t   tp;s;iºCs;i¹t   s;iºe j»2¹ fRF+ fD;s;iºt+s;i¼ + ns¹tº ; (3.2)
where the subscript ’s’ stands for “spoofer”. Specifically, Ns in the number of spoofed
satellites, Ds is the spoofed navigation data symbol sequence, Cs is the spoofed
spreading code sequence with a chip duration of Tc and ns is the noise. Moreover,
As ; s ; fD;s and s are, respectively, the spoofed amplitudes, code delays, Doppler
shifts and carrier phases. From now on, the dependency of the various functions on
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Figure 3.1: The spoofing threat continuum: simplistic, intermediate,
and sophisticated spoofing attacks. From [19].
s ; s ; fD;s and As will be dropped.
In this way, the total received signal at the victim receiver is
r¹tº  ra¹tº + rs¹tº ; (3.3)
where the noise term is included in the authentic and spoofing components.
3.2 Spoofing Generation Techniques
Spoofing generation techniques consists of the synthesis and transmission of fake
GNSS signals which are received by the victim in the form of Eq. (3.3). These
techniques can be categorized as follows (see Fig. 3.1) [10]:
• GNSS signal simulators: this category of spoofing attack consists of a GNSS
signal simulator connected to an RF transmitter. The signals generated by this
kind of spoofers are not essentially synchronized to real GNSS signals. In
other words, the spoofing correlation peaks are not essentially aligned with
the authentic ones. Therefore, this type of spoofing signals looks like noise for
a GNSS receiver operating in the tracking mode (even if the spoofer power is
higher than the authentic signals). However, this type of spoofers can adversely
affect the acquisition process of conventional GNSS receivers and degrade their
performance especially if the spoofing signal power is higher than that of the
authentic signals. A GPS signal simulator is the simplest GPS spoofer and it can
be detected by different anti-spoofing techniques such as amplitude monitoring,
consistency check among different measurements and consistency check with
Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs).
• Receiver-based spoofer: a more complicated type of spoofer consists of a GNSS
receiver concatenatedwith a spoofing transmitter. This systemfirst synchronizes
itself with the current GNSS signals and extracts the position, time and satellite
ephemeris and then generates the spoofing signal knowing the position of its
target receiver’s antenna. This spoofer can even mislead the tracking GNSS
receivers by generating synchronized fake signals.
This type of spoofers is relatively hard to detect since they are synchronized
with real GNSS satellites. The main challenge toward realization of this kind
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of spoofer is projecting the spoofing signals to the intended victim receiver
with the correct signal delay and strength. Figure 3.2 shows a repeater-spoofer
structure.
• Sophisticated receiver-based spoofer: this category is the most complex and effective
type of the spoofing generation methods. Herein, the spoofer is assumed to
know centimetre level position of the target receiver’s antenna phase centre
to perfectly synchronize the spoofing signal code and carrier phase to those
of authentic signals at the receiver. This type of spoofer can take advantage
of several transmit antennas in order to defeat angle of arrival (AOA) based
anti-spoofing techniques.
3.3 Spoofing Based on Receiver State
Satellite navigation receivers are susceptible to spoofing attacks rather differently
during the acquisition and the tracking phase. Spoofers will aim at taking advantage
of this dependency [20]:
• Spoofing starts before acquisition and the receiver has no a priori knowledge.
This situation occurs after the receiver is switched on (cold start). It provides a
maximum of options to the spoofer who wants the receiver to capture his signal
first. The receiver cannot distinguish the spoofer’s signal fromanauthenticGNSS
signal, unless the signal is somehow authenticated. Even if some information
is available to the receiver (e.g. almanac, user position, time estimation, etc.),
the clock may have drifted substantially and the position might be completely
different at power-up than it was at power-down.
• Spoofing starts before acquisition but the receiver has a priori knowledge. This
occurs if the receiver has lost one or all satellites for a short while (reacquisition),
or acquires satellites that have newly raised above the horizon. In this situation,
the spoofer has to be aware that the receiver combines knowledge about its
state, the environment, and their evolution to detect spoofer activity. Changes
that a receiver might analyze against models include position, clock-offsets, and
atmospheric delays.
• Spoofing during tracking. This is the most demanding situation for the spoofer,
since the signals now have to change in a manner compatible with the detailed
physical movement of the receiver, as well as with the changes in its environment.
The above description provides a characterization with respect to the relative timing
of spoofing and acquisition.
Figure 3.2: Repeater spoofer block diagram. From [10].
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Figure 3.3: Lift-off-delay spoofing attack (left) and corresponding
tracking error te (right) with spoofing commenced at T2. From [21].
3.4 Types of Spoofing Attacks
Spoofing aims to deceive the GNSS receiver estimate of position and timing infor-
mation. The navigation processing of a GNSS receiver makes use of the modulated
ranging code C¹tº and the navigation data information D¹tº conveyed in the GNSS
signal. This gives the chance to the spoofer to realize two attack types [10]:
• Signal processing level attacks: the structure of civilian GNSS signals, including the
modulation type, PRN signals, transmit frequency, signal bandwidth, Doppler
range, signal strength and many other features are publicly known. Therefore,
knowing the general structure and operational basics of a civilian GPS receiver, a
spoofer module can generate counterfeit signals that are similar to the authentic
GNSS signals so as to effectively mislead its target receiver by tuning the
parameters As ; s ; fD;s ; s of Eq. (3.2).
• Data bit level attacks: the framing structure of the GNSS signals is publicly
known. The navigation frame consists of different parts such as almanac and
satellite ephemeris. This information does not change rapidly during short time
intervals; for example, the satellite ephemeris information can be acquired in
less than 1 minute but it remains unchanged for 12.5 minutes. Therefore, the
spoofer can take advantage of this stability in order to create the GNSS data
frame.
An attacker can also leverage on a combination of the two types of attack in order
to lead the receiver to the desired PVT solution.
Many different variants of spoofing attacks can exists, depending on the receiver state,
the environment, etc. The following list encapsulates the most significant ones [21],
[22]:
• Lift-off-delay: the spoofer approaches the authentic signal with a relative delay
s (and possibly Doppler), adjusting the spoofing signal’s amplitude As.
Specifically, the spoofer starts with a certain relative delay and low amplitude,
then it gradually reduces s and simultaneously increases As. When s  0
the amplitude As is similar to the authentic one; at this point the spoofing power
starts exceding the received signal power and the relative delay is increased
again to move the tracking point farther away from the true signal parameters
(i.e., lift-off). An illustration of this attack is reported in Fig. 3.3.
• Lift-off-aligned: this attack is similar to the previous one, but with the spoofer
aligned to the line-of-sight (LOS) satellite signal (i.e., s  0) until As  A,
when the lift-off starts. It avoids being detected at a point distant to the prompt
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Figure 3.4: Meaconing attack: Introducing a delayed replica with
varying amplitude. From [21].
correlator, but it can create more abrupt changes to the tracking parameters
if the spoofing signal appears suddenly. The receiver is more vulnerable to
this attack during signal acquisition or, when accomplished with self-spoofing
devices, during tracking.
• Meaconing and selective delay: meaconing records the true GNSS signals with
a single reception antenna and replays the signals through a transmitter with
enough gain to overwhelm the true signal at the victim antenna andwith a delay
s  constant > 0. The victim receiver’s false position fix will be that of the
spoofer’s reception antenna. A meaconer has the potential to spoof any GNSS
signal, even an encrypted military signal. An representation of a meaconing
attack is shown in Fig. 3.4.
Selective delay attack is a more sophisticated meaconing attack in which the
spoofer uses multiple receiver antennas and phased-array signal processing
in order to record-and-replay each satellite signal on an individual channel.
Alternatively, using a single reception antenna, the attacker can separate the
signals by tracking the different PRNs, thus introducing an additional delay due
to the integration time in correlators. Such systems could independently steer
the relative delays for each satellite to produce any conceivable false position.
In case As < A, one speaks of “multipath attack” as the spoofing signal looks
like a nearby reflected signal. A multipath attack degrades the ranging accuracy
while leaving the tracking point close to the authentic signal.
• Jam and spoof : the spoofer forces the receiver into the acquisition mode via
excessive jamming that cause loss-of-lock on the authentic GNSS signals, while
transmitting spoofing signals. The the jammer is switched off with the intention
that the receiver acquires the spoofing signals.
• Nonline of sight spoofing: in suburban and urban environments a receiver will, in
general, neither be able to track all satellites above the recommendedmask angle,
nor will it be aware of the surrounding obstructions, creating the opportunity
for a spoofer to spoof the blocked LOS signals as shown in Fig. 3.5. Thus the
spoofer can transmit signals only for potentially blocked satellites, making it
difficult for the receiver to identify the presence of a spoofing signal.
• Trajectory spoofing: except in the case of meaconing, the spoofing signals can be
generated independently of each other or can refer to a common position. In
the latter case one speaks of a trajectory spoofing attack, where a spoofer with
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Figure 3.5: Non line-of-sight spoofing: Spoofing of low elevation
(blocked to the user) SVs. From [21].
the use of a GNSS signal simulator attempts to capture the tracking points of all
channels of a receiver along its intended trajectory, forcing the user to follow
the spoofed trajectory. In this case all spoofing signals will then be generated
coherently with respect to a specific trajectory, that would make satellite range
consistency techniques fail.
• Nulling: the spoofer transmits two signals for each spoofed signal. One is the
spoofed version that acts in concert with all other spoofed signals in order to
induce a false position/timing fix. The other is the negative of the true signal.
Nulling erases all traces of the true signal from the total received signal of
Eq. (3.3).
• Multiantenna spoofing: an advanced spoofer acting against a multiantenna victim
receiver might use multiple independent spoofer transmission antennas and
match each one to a corresponding receiver antenna. The relative geometry of
each spoofer/victim antenna pair would need to be known. Also, the spoofer
would need to be sufficiently close to the victim and have sufficiently narrow
individual antenna gain patterns so that each victim antenna received only
the signal from the intended spoofer antenna. Therefore this type of spoofing
would likely be practical only with a cooperative victim.
An expensive type of multiantenna spoofer might transmit only one spoofed
signal from each antenna. Such a spoofer might deceive spoofing defenses
that were based on signal direction of arrival. It might need to distribute its
antennas about the victim so that the spoofed signal arrival directions would
seem physically reasonable to the victim’s detection system.
Except for meaconing and selective delay, the attacks described above make the
assumption that the transmitted spreading code and the transmitted data bit stream
are known. However, if the signal is somehow authenticated, then C¹tº and D¹tº are
not fully predictable and the spoofer, tomount its attack, must synthesize approximate
replicas of them “on the fly” based on noisy received version of them. This can be
done using some prediction based attacks:
• Security code estimation and replay (SCER) [23]: this attack is based on estimating
the security code or the encrypted data bits by observing the received SIS. As
soon as the spoofer gets a reliable estimate, he immediately injects it in the signal
replica generator primed with up-to-date spreading code and carrier replicas.
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• Forward estimation attack (FMA) [24]: while SCER attack focuses on the received
signal in a chip by chip or symbol by symbol fashion as if theywere independent,
in this case it is exploited the redundancy introduced by the forward-error
orrection (FEC) used in some GNSS signals to predict the value of the later
symbols in a codeword, based on the observations of the earlier symbols.
• Statemodeling attack (SMA) [24]: although the adversarymight predict sufficiently
many navigation symbols such that the target receiver is oblivious to the attack,
not all symbols can be predicted. The target receiver may leverage this fact in an
attempt to protect itself from the adversary, by implementing a correlation-based
signal verification. This verification technique performs a correlation between
the received symbols and the genuine security related symbols available at
the receiver. If the received signal is authentic, then the correlation should
follow a Gaussian distribution with a certain mean. Given that the test cannot
distinguish energy accumulated in one symbol or another, the spoofer tunes the
amplitude of each spoofed symbol based on the a posteriori knowledge of the
correlation value calculated with the previously disclosed symbols.
In general, not all spoofing attacks will be applicable to all user cases. For example, a
lift-off-delay attack would not be feasible for high dynamics users, or a multipath-like
attack would probably not be effective for nonline of sight or dense multipath channel
conditions. This fact has to be taken into account to assess the performance of the
anti-spoofing techniques that are the focus of the next Sections.
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Signal Processing Techniques for
Anti-Spoofing
In recent years, several research groups and companies have focused on GNSS
interference countermeasures and several articles have been published in this regard.
The special case of spoofing countermeasures has recently attracted considerable
research interest as spoofing is such a potential menace. However, civilian commercial
GNSS receivers remain generally defenceless against this type of interference. The
main focus of the research in the field of GNSS spoofing countermeasure is to answer
the following questions: “How can a GNSS receiver make sure that it is providing a
valid position solution?” and “How can this receiver recover its positioning capability
once it is exposed to counterfeit GNSS signals?”.
Spoofing countermeasure techniques can be classified into two main categories:
• Spoofing detection: spoofing detection algorithms concentrate on discriminating
the spoofing signals but they do not necessarily perform countermeasures
against the spoofing attack.
• Spoofing mitigation: spoofing mitigation techniques mainly concentrate on
neutralizing the detected spoofing signals and help the victim receiver to
retrieve its positioning and navigation abilities.
Another possible classification is to view the anti-spoofing techniques fromamultilayer
perspective:
• Signal processing level techniques: these techniques are applicable within the
antenna, front end and baseband signal processing blocks of a typical GNSS
receiver and are based on signal processing algorithms.
• Data bit level techniques: data bit level techniques are performed after the
data demodulation block and can be subdivided in cryptographic and non
cryptographic. The non cryprographic techniques rely on analysis of the
navigation message, such as clock and ephemeris consistency check between
different satellites, while the cryptographic ones are based on encryption in
order to create unpredictable parts of the transmitted signal; however, most of
latter require some modifications in the GNSS signal structure.
• Position solution and navigation level techniques: finally, these techniques are
implemented in the application processing level and are mainly based on a
consistency check of solution with other navigation and position technologies,
such as IMU and wifi/cellular positioning.
Spoofing threat might be detected/mitigated at any of the above-mentioned levels.
Moreover, cross-layer techniques can be developed to incorporate measurements from
different operational levels.
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This Chapter concentrates on spoofing detection and mitigation techniques at the
signal processing level and it is mainly based on the classification of anti-spoofing
methods done in [10], [21], [22].
4.1 Spoofing Detection
4.1.1 Methods Based on the Received Signal Strength (RSS)
RSS based spoofing countermeasure techniques rely on the assumption that the power
level of spoofing signals is higher than authentic GNSS signals in order to be able to
misdirect their target GNSS receiver(s).
AGC Monitoring A spoofing countermeasure method based on monitoring the
receiver’s AGC gain level is based on the fact that the presence of spoofing signals
increases the power content of the received signal set and this changes the AGC level,
possibly moving it to an abnormal value. Based on the analyses provided by [25],
AGC monitoring is a powerful measure for detecting the presence of spoofing signals
especially if their power level is considerably higher than that of the authentic ones.
C/N0 Monitoring Most GPS receivers employ CN0 measurements as a parameter
that characterizes the received signal quality. In open sky conditions, only satellite
movement and ionosphere variations can cause gradual smooth changes in the
received signal power. However, when a higher power spoofer misleads a GPS
receiver, the received CN0 may experience a sudden change that can indicate the
presence of the spoofing signal. The anti-spoofing receiver can continuously monitor
the CN0 and look for any unusual variation that can be a sign of spoofing attack.
It is easy for a GPS receiver to store a time history of the signal received from each
satellite.
The CN0 measurement for each GPS signal is proportional to the ratio between
the despread signal power at the correlator output to the noise power plus other
signal interferences. The postprocessing SNR, which is linked to the CN0 value, can
be shown as
SNR  PjIa j2 + jIs j2 + ¹2Mº
; (4.1)
where P  A22 is the authentic signal power, Ia and Is are interference terms caused
by cross-correlation effect of other authentic and spoofing signals, 2 is the variance of
the received noise n and M is the number of samples within the coherent integration
time. GNSS signals are designed such that jIa j2 is negligible compared to the filtered
Gaussian noise variance. However, jIs j2 increases as the total spoofing power (TSP)
increases. TSP is the sum of signal powers for different spoofing PRNs. Therefore, an
asynchronous spoofing source that is transmitting several PRNs with considerable
power can effectively reduce the CN0 of the authentic signals.
However, during signal acquisition, a spoofer with an high TPS generates correlation
peaks higher than the authentic ones over an elevated noise floor due to the cross-
correlation term Is. Therefore, if a spoofing signal is despread, its corresponding
CN0 measurement would be in the normal authentic CN0 range. As a consequence,
the receiver might be tracking the higher power spoofing correlation peaks while its
CN0 measurement does not show any abnormalities.
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Figure 4.1: Vulnerability region comparison of CN0 versus absolute
power monitoring techniques. From [10].
Absolute Power Monitoring As the path loss between the spoofer and target
receiver is highly variable, it is difficult for a spoofer to estimate the transmit power
required to impose sufficient signal strength at the target receiver while not excessively
exceeding the typical power level of the authentic GPS signals. Themaximum received
power of the GNSS signals at earth terminals is around  153 dBW at the L1 frequency.
Therefore, reception of a spoofing signal whose absolute power is considerably higher
than the expected authentic GNSS signal power is a simple direct means of detecting
a spoofing attack.
Figure 4.1 provides a comparison between the spoofing vulnerability regions for a
CN0 monitoring receiver and an absolute power monitoring receiver during signal
acquisition. It has been assumed that the absolute power monitoring receiver is able
to discriminate the elevated noise floor as well as higher power PRN signals within a
2 dB accuracy range. In other words, this receiver discriminates those PRNs whose
absolute power is 2 dB or higher than the maximum possible received power of GPS
L1 C/A signal. Furthermore, this receiver is capable of detecting a 2 dB increase in
noise floor from its desired value. On the other hand, the CN0 monitoring receiver is
only able to discriminate the signals whose SNR is higher than the maximum possible
SNR of the GPS L1 C/A signal.
Hence, the vulnerability region of the absolute power monitoring receiver is much
smaller than the vulnerability region of the CN0 monitoring receiver. Furthermore,
if the receiver is able to detect the absolute receiver power more accurately, it can
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Figure 4.2: Variations of spoofing and authentic received CN0 versus
receiver distance from spoofer transmitting antenna. From [10].
considerably reduce the size of its vulnerability window in the presence of a spoofing
attack.
Implementation of this power monitoring technique requires the receiver ability
to measure the absolute amplitude of the received signal within a certain accuracy
level. Hence, the hardware complexity slightly increases. In addition, the relatively
high dynamic range of the GPS signal strength imposes another limitation to the
performance of the amplitude discrimination techniques.
Received Power Variations versus Receiver Movement Based on the free space
square law of propagation, the received power of a free space propagating signal
is proportional to the inverse of the squared propagation distance. GNSS satellites
are around 20 000 kilometers away from the earth surface; therefore, if the receiver
moves on the earth surface in low multipath open sky environments, no considerable
change in the received power from authentic satellites should be observed other
than the deterministic losses occurring at lower elevations. However, the spoofing
signal is usually transmitted from a single directional antenna located much closer
to the receiver compared to the GPS satellites. Therefore, the movement of the
receiver relative to the spoofer antenna can considerably change the CN0 received
from spoofing signals. Figure 4.2 illustrates the variations of spoofing and authentic
received CN0 values versus the receiver distance from a spoofer antenna. It is
observed that when the spoofer is very close to its target receiver, even a slight
movement between spoofer and the target receiver can considerably affect the received
spoofing signal CN0. It should be considered that all the spoofing signals are usually
transmitted from the same antenna and therefore all experience the same propagation
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medium. As such, variations of all spoofing signals will be the same regardless of the
receiver movement and multipath effects. Here it is assumed that the spoofer does
not differentially modulate the CN0 of the different PRN signals.
This method is a low-complexity spoofing discrimination technique that does not
impose extensive hardware/software modifications to the GPS receiver. However,
since the receiver does not necessarily know the position of the spoofer antenna and
the distance variations with respect to the receiver antenna, there is no guarantee
that the receiver movement considerably changes the received CN0 of the spoofer
generated signals. For example, when both spoofing transmitter and GPS receiver
are located in the same vehicle, the movement of vehicle does not cause variation in
measure of spoofing signals CN0. Another disadvantage of this technique is that it
cannot be employed for the case of static GPS receivers. Therefore, the effectiveness
of this spoofing discrimination technique is limited to a few spoofing scenarios.
Structural Power Analysis (SPA) The structure of spoofing signals is very similar
to that of authentic GNSS signals. The presence of additional spoofing PRNs
increases the power content of structural signals in the GNSS frequency band. This
excessive amount of power can be detected prior to the despreading process using
the authenticity verification method proposed by [26], that is based on comparing
a detection test statistic (the variance of a filtered version of the received signal) to
a threshold in order to differentiate between the presence and absence of spoofing
signals. This technique can successfully detect the presence of spoofing signals when
these are powerful enough to interrupt the normal operation of user equipment,
even if the receiver is equipped with an AGC that applies an unknown gain to the
received signal set. The computational complexity of this method is relatively low;
therefore, it can be used as an integrated signal authenticity verification block in
civilian GPS receivers or it can be materialized as a portable stand-alone GPS signal
quality assurance system.
Relative Frequency Band Power Monitoring There is a predefined power level
difference between GNSS signals in different frequency bands and many GNSS
receivers are able to monitor signals in different bands separately. However, a
low-complexity spoofer may only generate a single-band signal. Therefore, a large
difference between two different band power levels or the absence of a particular band
in a signal can reveal the presence of a spoofing signal. This method can successfully
detect the single-band spoofers. However, most of the civil GPS receivers do not have
the ability to monitor different frequency bands and this discrimination technique
imposes additional hardware complexity to the GPS receiver.
4.1.2 Spoofing Discrimination Using Spatial Processing
Due to logistical limitations, spoofing transmitters usually transmit several counterfeit
signals from the same antenna while the authentic signals are transmitted from
different satellites with different directions. Therefore, a spatial processing technique
can be employed to estimate the spatial signature of received signals and discriminate
those signals that are spatially correlated.
Multiantenna Spoofing Discrimination There are several proposals that make use
of a multiantenna receiver:
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• In [9] a spoofing detection technique is proposed which observes the phase dif-
ference between two fixed antennas for around one hour. Knowing the bearing
of the antenna array and the satellites movement trajectory, the theoretical phase
differences can be calculated and compared to the practical phase difference
observed by the antenna array to discriminate the spoofing threat. The main
drawback of the algorithm is that it takes a long time (about 1 hour) to dis-
criminate the spoofing signals. In addition, this technique requires a calibrated
antenna array with known array orientation in order to operate properly.
• Another method that is based on the carrier-phase difference between two
receiver antennas is proposed in [27]. The signal-in-space properties used to
detect spoofing are the relationships of the signal arrival directions to the vector
that points from one antenna to the other. In the un-spoofed case, there are a
multiplicity of relationships between the interantenna vector and the arrival
directions of the multiple signals, which results in a quantifiable multiplicity
of carrier-phase single-differences between the antennas. In the spoofed case,
there is a single direction of arrival, assuming a single spoofer transmission
antenna, and the carrier phase single-differences are identical for all channels,
up to an integer cycle ambiguity.
A spoofing detection statistic is developed that equals the difference between
the optimized values of the negative-log-likelihood cost functions for two data
fitting problems. One problem fits the single-differenced beat carrier phases of
multiple received signals to a spoofed model in which the fractional parts of
these differences are identical - in the absence of receiver noise - because the
spoofed signals all arrive from the same direction. The other problem fits the
single-differenced carrier phases to a non-spoofed model. The simple difference
of the two optimized cost functions equals a large positive number if there is no
spoofing, but it equals a negative number if the signals are being spoofed.
Figure 4.3 demonstrates the performance of this spoofing detection algorithm.
The upper panel shows the beat carrier phase difference time histories between
the two antennas and the bottom panel the corresponding spoofing detection
statistic time history before (t < 400 s) and after a spoofing attack (t > 400 s),
revealing the successful detection.
However, other tests revealed some challenges for this spoofing detection
strategy. They occur primarily during the initial attack phase, before the spoofer
has dragged the victim receiver to a wrong position or timing fix. If the spoofer
power is not very much larger than that of the true signals, then beating occurs
between the spoofed and true signals during this initial period. This beating
can cause difficulties for the receiver tracking loops, making single-differenced
carrier phase unavailable.
A multiple-antenna spoofer might be able to defeat the multiple-antenna spoofing
discrimination techniques depending on the number of transmit antennas, the number
of receiver antennas, and the geometry of spoofer antennas with respect to the target
receiver antennas. However, there are many practical limitations to realizing such a
sophisticated spoofing scenario.
Synthetic Spoofing Array Discrimination Anti-spoofing methods that use a syn-
thetic spoofing array are mainly based on pairwise correlation and carrier phase bias:
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Figure 4.3: Single-differenced carrier phase time histories (top plot) and
spoofing detection statistic time history (bottom plot) for a spoofing
attack. From [27].
• In [28] a spoofing detection technique that employs a synthetic antenna array
has been proposed. In this scenario a single-antenna handheld GPS receiver is
moved along a random trajectory and forms a synthetic antenna array structure.
This scenario is shown in Fig. 4.4. The received signals amplitude and phase
corresponding to different PRN signals are continually compared to each other
using a correlation coefficient metric (i j). Therefore, after acquiring different
PRN signals in the received signal set (both authentic and spoofing signals),
spoofing signals are discriminated using the following normalized correlation
coefficient:
i ; j  j
E
[
¹yºHi ¹yº j
]
√
E
[
¹yºHi ¹yº j
]√
E
[
¹yºHj ¹yº j
] j ; (4.2)
Figure 4.4: Spatial sampling for a moving handheld GPS receiver.
From [10].
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Figure 4.5: Correlation amplitude for spoofing and authentic PRN
signals. From [10].
where E»¼ represents the statistical expectation and the superscript H denotes
the conjugate transpose. ¹yºi and ¹yº j represent the i-th and j-th columns of
matrix y, which is defined as follows:
y 

»ya»1¼; ys»1¼¼
»ya»2¼; ys»2¼¼
:::
»ya»J¼; ys»J¼¼
 JL
;
ya»k¼  [ya1¹kMTsº; : : : ; yaN¹kMTsº] ;
ys»k¼ 
[
ys1¹kMTsº; : : : ; ysNs¹kMTsº
]
:
(4.3)
In Eq. (4.3), it is assumed that correlator outputs are monitored during J time
instances and y is an JLmatrix where L is the number of acquired PRN signals
(L  N + Ns). ya»k¼ is the set of correlator outputs for all acquired authentic
signals at time instant kMTs, whereas ys»k¼ consists of all acquired spoofing
peaks for that time instant. J is the number of equivalent spatial samples and
M is the number of samples within the coherent integration time.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the normalized signal amplitude for acquired spoofing
and authentic signals. During the data collection, the antenna was randomly
moved. It is observed that the amplitude variations for spoofing signals are
highly correlated (i.e., the plots representing the amplitudes of PRN-16, PRN-18,
PRN-21, and PRN-29 are totally overlaid) while this correlation does not exist for
4.1. Spoofing Detection 39
the authentic signals (i.e., the amplitudes of PRN-22 and PRN-24 do not overlay).
This technique works effectively even in multipath environments because all
the spoofing signals experience the same fading path. Furthermore, since this
method does not employ several receive antennas, its hardware complexity is
much lower as compared to the technique proposed in [9]. However, in the case
that spoofer differentially modulates the amplitude and/or phase of different
PRN signals, some modifications should be applied to this method in order to
successfully discriminate the counterfeit signals.
• In [29] a method is proposed that uses a short segment of beat carrier-phase time
histories that are collected while the receiver’s single antenna is undergoing a
known, high frequency motion profile, typically one pre-programmed into an
antenna articulation system. The antenna also can be moving in an unknown
way at lower frequencies, as might be the case if it were mounted on a ground
vehicle, a ship, an airplane, or a spacecraft. The spoofing detection algorithm
correlates high-pass-filtered versions of the known motion component with
high-pass-filtered versions of the carrier phase variations. True signals produce
a specific correlation pattern, and spoofed signals produce a recognizably
different correlation pattern if the spoofer transmits its false signals from a
single antenna. The most pronounced difference is that non-spoofed signals
display variations between the beat carrier phase responses of multiple signals,
but all signals’ responses are identical in the spoofed case. These differing
correlation characteristics are used to develop a hypothesis test in order to detect
a spoofing attack or the lack thereof.
4.1.3 Time of Arrival (TOA) Discrimination
PRN Code and Data Bit Latency In the case that the receiver-based spoofer does
not have any prior information regarding the navigation data bits, it should first
decode the received GPS signals and then generate a processed replica as the spoofing
signal. Hence, an unavoidable delay exists between the spoofing data bit boundaries
with respect to the authentic ones. Therefore, if the data bit transition happens at
time instants with a spacing other than the data bit period, then a spoofing attack
might be present.
This technique encounters some limitations because the GNSS data frame structure is
already known and it consists of different parts with different update frequencies. The
update frequency of most parts of the GNSS frame is very low. Therefore, the majority
of the GNSS data bits can be predicted by the spoofer if it has already acquired the
GNSS information before starting to transmit the fake spoofing signals.
Different Band Signals RelativeDelay GNSS satellites transmit signals on different
frequency bands. The signals received on different frequencies have a relative
delay/attenuation that is caused by the different frequency response of the ionosphere.
Therefore, if amultiple frequencyGNSS receiver correlates the different band signals, it
should observe only one correlation peak. The GNSS receiver knows the approximate
delay correlation relative delay of correlation peaks, therefore the spoofer should be
able to generate signals on different frequencies with the correct delay in order to
defeat this countermeasure.
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4.1.4 Correlation Peak Monitoring
SignalQualityMonitoring (SQM) SQMtechniqueshavebeenpreviously employed
to monitor the GPS correlation peak quality in multipath fading environments. The
interaction between spoofing and authentic signals can affect the correlator output
in a way similar to that of multipath components. Therefore, reference [14] has
extended the previously proposed SQM techniques to detect spoofing attacks on
tracking receivers working in LOS conditions. Different metrics have been proposed
in order to detect any abnormal asymmetry and/or flatness of correlation peaks that
is imposed by the interaction between authentic and spoofing signals. Two of the
most common test metrics are the delta test, with metric
 
IE   IL
IP
; (4.4)
and the ratio test, with metric
R 
IE + IL
IP
; (4.5)
where  is a constant factor, that represents the slope of the correlation function. The
metrics are then used to build a test statistic to decide whether spoofing is present
or not. For example, in the case the delta test is used, it is easy to see that the mean
value of will tend to zero in a clean data set, and in case of asymmetries, will be a
positive or a negative number, based on the delay and phase of the spoofing signal. It
is assumed that the receiver has initially locked onto the authentic correlation peaks
and a spoofing source tries to deceive the receiver toward tracking its fake correlation
peaks.
The SQM antispoofing techniques are powerful methods toward detecting the
spoofing attack especially in the LOS propagation environments. However, in the
presence of multipath propagation, the SQMmethodmight not be able to discriminate
between spoofing signals and multipath reflections.
Coupled Amplitude Delay Locked Loop (CADLL) The CADLL was initially de-
signed as a pure multipath estimation and mitigation architecture. However, its
ability to accurately estimate the features of multipath rays and their evolution in
time, allowed [30] to revisit it to detect spoofing signals. The CADLL is composed of
several parallel tracking units, each tracking a component signal. Inside each tracking
unit, a normal DLL with wide or narrow spacing is used to track the code phase
and two amplitude-locked loops (ALL) are used to track the amplitudes of I and Q
components of the signal.
The working procedure of CADLL is made of different steps. It first uses a
conventional tracking loop to lock onto the incoming signal getting a rough estimation
about the code phase of LOS signal and then it activates two units in order to try to
track a multipath signal. If the inserted unit fails to track any signal, it means there
is no multipath in the incoming signal. It continues inserting a new unit into this
feedback loop to look for a new multipath component. A monitor block is governing
the process of searching a new multipath component by checking the tracking results
of the new unit. If it is considered that there is no new multipath component, the
trial unit will be shut down by the monitor block. In fact the parameters of each unit
are normally monitored to decide for enabling additional unit or shutting down a
unit that is not actually tracking a signal. The process will not stop until there is no
new multipath found or the number of enabled units reaches the maximum number
which is pre-defined according to available resources.
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The spoofing detection technique basically requires a modification of the monitoring
unit of the CADLL. The basic idea is to compare the features of the monitored
components with the expected behavior of a replica due to a reflection. Such a
comparison is essentially based on two principles:
• Multipath delay cannot be smaller than LOS delay.
• Multipath amplitude is correlated with the delay, i.e. the distance of the obstacle
generating the reflection.
Only two units are required for spoofing detection purposes. However, more units
may allow dealing with environments where both spoofing signals and multipath are
present.
Distribution Analysis of the Correlator Output In LOS conditions, the correlator
output power for a tracking receiver approximately follows a Chi-squared (2)
distribution. For the case of a spoofing attack on a tracking receiver, the spoofing
signal correlation peak should be located as close as possible to that of the authentic
signal; therefore, the correlator output power is affected by the spoofing signals. If
the interaction between authentic and spoofing signals causes the correlator output to
considerably deviate from the expected distribution for authentic signals, a spoofing
attack will be flagged. This feature can be used for detecting the presence of
spoofing signals. For example, for the case of consistent Doppler spoofing attack on a
tracking receiver, the interaction between spoofing and authentic signals causes rapid
fluctuations in the amplitude of the correlator output and these fluctuations can be
detected by the proposed countermeasure technique. Figure 4.6 shows the correlator
output distributions for different relative powers for authentic and spoofing signals.
It is observed that the correlator output distributions are completely different in the
presence and absence of spoofing attacks.
This technique can successfully discriminate spoofing signals in the LOS prop-
agation environments. However, in presence of multipath propagation, the 2
distribution is not a valid assumption for the distribution of correlator output ampli-
tude. Therefore, this method is of limited applicability in nonline of sight propagation
environments.
Correlator’s Spectral Analysis The proposal in [31] is based on the idea that GNSS
signal replicas are a very specific type of interference. Unlike commonRF interferences,
spoofing may not be evident until the receiver has corrected its carrier and code at
the correlation process. Therefore, by analysing the output correlation values of the
receiver one could find the traces of the interferences. At this point, the resulting
signal in an interference-free environment is a constant value affected by noise while
in the presence of multiple signals with the same spreading code, it is a sum of
complex sinusoids at the residual frequencies. The remaining frequency errors in
the second case are occasioned by the presence of the interference that affects the
correct demodulation of the authentic signal. It is possible to detect the presence of
the interference formulating a decision problem with the two states of the output
correlation using the GLRT which allows to decide the most likely event. However,
it requires the estimation of the residual frequencies which are difficult to estimate
using classical non-parametric techniques like the periodogram when the data record
is short. For this reason the authors propose the use of a super-resolution frequency
estimation method based on the Pisarenko harmonic decomposition (PHD) due to its
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of prompt correlator output power for authen-
tic signals and authentic-spoofing interaction for different spoofing
powers. From [10].
simplicity compared to other algorithms. Thanks to the estimates obtained with PHD
it is possible to carry out the GLRT and detect the presence of the interference.
4.1.5 Signal Parameters Monitoring
Doppler Shift Check GNSS receivers have position solution and satellite position.
The relative speed of the receiver with respect to each GPS satellite can thus be derived.
It is impossible to get all the Doppler shifts for all satellites correct by mimicking
satellite movement by the spoof source using a single transmitter because the Doppler
shift is changing carrier frequency. Although CDMA signals with different PRN
code can be summed before being modulated on a carrier, the spoof signal has to be
modulated to a different carrier to avoid the Doppler test. A spoofer might thus have
to use one transmitter for each spoofed space vehicle (SV). The Doppler shift should
also compare with the rate at which the phase range measurement changes, i.e.
fD   Û ; (4.6)
where Û is the phase rate and   1 fRF.
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Code and Phase Rates Consistency Check In the case of authentic signals, the
Doppler frequency and the code delay rate are consistent because they are both
affected by the relative movement between GPS satellite and receiver. This consistency
requires that
fD    fRF Û ; (4.7)
where Û is the code delay rate. A low-quality spoofer might not keep this consistency
between Doppler frequency and code delay rate. As such, a spoofing aware receiver
can successfully detect this type of spoofers if the loop filter output of PLL and DLL
are not consistent. The PLL and DLL loop filter outputs are estimates of the phase
and delay rates, respectively.
Table 4.1 provides a summarized comparison among the previously discussed
spoofing detection algorithms.
Table 4.1: Summary of spoofing detection techniques.
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Table 4.1: Summary of spoofing detection techniques (continued).
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4.2 Spoofing Mitigation
4.2.1 Vestigial Signal Detection
Suppressing the authentic signal is very hard for GNSS spoofers because it requires
precise knowledge of the victim antenna phase centre position relative to spoofer
antenna phase centre. In most cases, after successful lift-off, a vestige of the authentic
signal that can be used for spoofing detection and mitigation remains. In [8] the
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authors have proposed a vestigial detection technique in which the receiver employs
the following software-defined technique. First, the receiver copies the incoming
digitized front end data into a buffer memory. Second, the receiver selects one of
the GPS signals being tracked and removes the locally regenerated version of this
signal from the buffered signal. Third, the receiver performs acquisition for the same
PRN signal on the buffered data. This technique is very similar to the successive
interference cancellation (SIC) used for removing strong signals in order to combat
the near/far problem in Direct Sequence Code Division Multiple-Access (DS-CDMA)
networks.
The implementation of the vestigial signal detection increases the hardware and
processing complexity of the receivers because this technique requires additional
tracking channels to track both authentic and spoofing signals. In addition, in the
presence of high power spoofing signals and limited bit resolution, the authentic
vestigemight not still be detectable since it might have been fallen under the sensitivity
level of the GNSS receiver quantizer.
4.2.2 Multiantenna Beamforming and Null Steering
A multiantenna receiver can employ array processing techniques in order to shape its
beam. As such, after detecting the direction of spoofing signal, this receiver can steer
a null toward the spoofer source and suppress its harmful effect. Therefore, spoofing
signals can be mitigated if the received signal is multiplied by a complex weighting
vector ( f ) such that
f Hb  0 ; constraint: k f k  1 ; (4.8)
where b is the steering vector incorporating all spatial characteristics of the antenna
array for spoofing signals, assuming the spoofer uses a single transmitting antenna.
• In [32] an antenna array structure is used to detect and mitigate spoofing signals
based on their spatial correlation. The correlator output phase measurements
for different PRN signals are mutually compared to discriminate the ones
received from the same spatial sector, that are then spatially nulled through
beamforming. This technique can successfully detect and mitigate spoofing
signals originated from a single transmit antenna and it does not need any
array calibration or information regarding array orientation. In addition, the
multipath propagation does not degrade the performance of this method since
all the spoofing signals experience the same propagation channel characteristics.
However, this technique increases the hardware complexity of the GNSS receiver
as it necessitates the use of several antenna branches. Furthermore, applying
this method increases the computational complexity of GNSS receiver since the
receiver needs to acquire and track both spoofing and authentic signals in order
to be able to discriminate spoofing PRNs.
• In [33] a very low computational complexity double antenna spoofingmitigation
method is proposed that is able to spatially filter out the spoofing signals. This
method cross-correlates the received signals fromdifferent antennas and extracts
the spatial signature of spoofing signals based on their spatial power dominancy.
All these operations are performed on the raw samples before despreading
the authentic and spoofing signals. Assuming that spoofer module transmits
several PRN signals each of which having a power level comparable to authentic
ones, the steering vector corresponding to spoofing signals (b) can be extracted
because all spoofing signals are coming from the same direction. This method
46 Chapter 4. Signal Processing Techniques for Anti-Spoofing
Figure 4.7: Authentic and spoofed SNR variations as a function of
average spoofing power. From [10].
does not need array calibration or any prior information regarding antenna array
orientation and can be employed as an in-line stand-alone antenna combining
block that mitigates the spoofing signals at before entering the conventional
GNSS receivers.
Figure 4.7 shows the average SNR of the authentic and spoofing signals as a
function of the average input spoofing power for both the single-antenna and
the proposed double antenna receivers. For the case of single-antenna receiver,
the authentic SNR decreases as the input spoofing power increases. However,
it is observed that after proper combining of the signals of both antennas, the
SNR of the authentic signal almost remains constant while the spoofing SNR is
always far below the detection threshold for different input spoofing powers.
The spoofing mitigation technique proposed in [33] successfully mitigates the
spoofing signals as long as their TSP is considerably higher than the average
power of authentic signals. Nevertheless, in some cases it might unintentionally
reduce the power of some authentic signals due to the inherent cone of ambiguity
in the double-antenna beam pattern. This problem can be solved by employing
larger antenna arrays because the ambiguity region of antenna beam pattern
considerably decreases as the number of array elements increases. This spoofing
mitigation technique might not perform well in the case of multiple-antenna
spoofing transmission.
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Figure 4.8: Block diagram of the SEDLL receiver architecture. From
[34].
4.2.3 Spoofing Estimating Delay Lock Loop (SEDLL)
The SEDLL [34] is another promising technique, which is based on the Multipath
Estimating Delay Lock Loop (MEDLL) approach. The MEDLL applies maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE) in order to decrease the position error caused by mul-
tipath propagation. MEDLL largely reduces code and carrier tracking errors by
simultaneously estimating the parameters of LOS and multipath signals.
The following adaptations of the MEDLL have been identified, in order to cope with
spoofing specific features:
• Algorithm initialization: since MEDLL assumes that the authentic signal is
associated with the highest peak, but the spoofer power might be greater than
the authentic, a proper adaptation of the MEDLL shall be made in order to
properly initialize the iterative cancellation and prevent the algorithm to cancel
out the authentic peak.
• Multi-correlator receiver: multipath cancellation techniques are typically effective
for almost synchronized, i.e. a spoofer whose delay respect to prompt correlator
is in the order of few tents of chips. To address unsynchronized spoofers the
monitoring correlation window shall be enlarged by increasing the number of
correlators per tracking channel.
To give a brief mathematical model behind this technique, we start from the CAF
of Eq. (2.13) for a single LOS path and, neglecting the Doppler estimation error, the
complex baseband model of the k-th correlator output Sk at a given instant is
Sk 
P 1Õ
n0
nR¹   nºke jn + k (4.9)
where R¹   nºk is the reference ACF, shifted by n and evaluated on the k-th
correlator. P is the number of path considered and k is a correlated Gaussian noise
component. The term n  An sinc¹ fDTsº, n is the phase misalignment among the
n-th path and the estimated PLL phase and n is the code error among the n-th path
and the code delay estimated by the DLL.
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(a) Standard DLL (b) SEDLL
Figure 4.9: SEDLL Spoofing cancellation. From [34].
The rationale behind MEDLL is to find, for all the P paths, the best estimate of
the tuples ¹ Æn ; Æn ; Ænº in the ML sense, i.e. find the ÆSk  ÍP 1n0 ÆnR¹   Ænºke j Æn
that minimize the quadratic norm
U   ÆU, with U and ÆU vector notation for the
correlator output. The estimation is performed in an iterative way: the algorithm
starts estimating the main path and neglect P   1 paths; then, estimate two paths,
neglecting P   2 paths, using a convenient number of steps; the process continues
estimating path by path up to P.
In order to deal with the fact that MEDLL assumes that the authentic signal is
associated with the highest peak, SEDLL introduces an ALL to track the amplitude
of the authentic signal implemented as a Kalman filter. The Kalman is based on the
observations of the amplitude and tracks the two state x  ¹A; ÛAºT, i.e. the amplitude
and amplitude rate. The SEDLL algorithm performs the MEDLL steps with this initial
guess:
¹ Æa00 ; Æ00 ; Æ00º  ¹A˜; 0; 0º ; (4.10)
where A˜ is the predicted authentic signal amplitude as from the Kalman filter
prediction stage. Delay and phase are set to 0 since it is assumed that both the DLL
and PLL are tracking the authentic signal. This assumption is valid if the SEDLL is
effective in canceling the spoofer. The block diagram of SEDLL is depicted in Fig. 4.8.
In Fig. 4.9 a comparison of a standard DLL (on the left) with the SEDLL (on the right)
is shown (plotted curves are for I and Q). In this case the spoofer is centered at
0:5 chip of delay with a phase of 45° and a amplitude of 3 dB greater than authentic
signal. The standard DLL experience a code error of about 0:43 chip, while the SEDLL
is able to reach 0:016 chip of error.
The main drawback of this technique comes with its sensitivity during the
initialization stages. In the SEDLL architecture evolution it is foreseen to perform a
combination with a spoofing detection mechanism, such as SQM metrics, in order to
switch the SEDLL on only when needed. SEDLL in fact slightly degrades the DLL
and PLL performance, in terms of variance of the estimates.
4.2.4 Spoofing Detection, Classification and Cancellation (SDCC)
This technique is proposed in [35] and it is divided in three stages. The first stage
of the SDCC architecture is detection of a spoofing attack. Among many spoofing
detection methods proposed in the literature, three low computational complexity
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Figure 4.10: Block diagram of the SDCC receiver architecture. From
[10].
and effective techniques are considered where include AGC gain level or ADC sample
histogram monitoring, structural power analysis and acquisition level detection. The
techniques check for abnormally high AGC gain levels or an unusual structural power
content of the received signals to flag the presence of a possible spoofing attack.
The modified signal acquisition stage includes searching all possible code phase
and carrier Doppler bins and passing all the signals that are above the designated
acquisition threshold to the tracking stage. Occurrence of two or more detectable
signals in the acquisition stage may indicate that the receiver is under a spoofing
attack and enables the spoofing detection flag.
After detecting all visible satellites which are above the acquisition threshold, all
the detected signals including the authentic and spoofing signals will be tracked. In
the case of a spoofing attack, the receiver requests the operator to briefly move the
receiver antenna for authentic/spoofing classification. The input of the classification
unit as shown in Fig. 4.10 is the tracked signal parameters including raw carrier
Doppler measurements. The receiver motion can be detected by incorporating a
low-cost IMU in the receiver. The authors in [28] have proposed a method based on
taking pairwise correlation between signal observations to discriminate the spoofing
signals from the authentic ones. Based on the measured correlation coefficient values,
signals are sorted in two groups, namely spoofing and authentic. The spoofing group
is the signal set that is highly correlated, and the authentic group is the set that is
uncorrelated. The proper placement of the members in the authentic and spoofing
groups can be reassessed after the PVT solution as the set of measurements in each
group should provide the lowest navigation solution residuals.
After authentic and spoofing signal classification, SDCC enters the spoofing
cancellation stage using the successive spoofing cancellation (SSC) method. The
input of this processing unit, as shown in Fig. 4.10, is raw IF samples, the list of
spoof PRNs and the tracked signal parameters of all channels. In this stage, the
receiver continuously tracks all spoofing and authentic signals to provide accurate
measurements of the signal parameters including code offset, Doppler frequency,
carrier phase and signal amplitude. After reaching a reliable tracking performance
for each individual spoofing channel, the tracked spoofing signals are reconstructed
and removed from the original digitized IF samples to provide a spoofing-free IF
sample set. After spoofing mitigation, the SDCC architecture runs acquisition again
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to detect potential authentic and spoofing signals that were not detected in the first
acquisition process.
Table 4.2 provides a summarized comparison among the previously discussed
spoofing mitigation algorithms.
Table 4.2: Summary of spoofing mitigation techniques.
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Chapter 5
Optimal Spoofing Attacks against
Signal Quality Monitoring
Techniques
5.1 Spoofing Scenario
Recalling the description of a general model for a spoofing attack in Section 3.1, we
restrict the formulation to a single satellite attack. Therefore, an authentic GNSS
signal at the front-end output takes the form
ra¹tº  AaDa¹t   tp;aºCa¹t   aºe j»2¹ fIF+ fD;aºt+a¼ + na¹tº ; (5.1)
where the subscript ’a’ stands for “authentic”. On the other hand, the corresponding
spoofing signal can be written in the form
rs¹tº  AsDs¹t   tp;sºCs¹t   sºe j»2¹ fIF+ fD;sºt+s¼ + ns¹tº ; (5.2)
where the subscript ’s’ stands for “spoofing”. The total received signal at the victim
receiver is
r¹tº  ra¹tº + rs¹tº : (5.3)
The impact of a spoofing attack can be better described deriving the CAF relative to
Eq. (5.3) that, extending the result in Eq. (2.13), becomes
S  ADR¹º sinc¹ fDTcohºe j + AsDsRs¹sº sinc
(
 fD;sTcoh
)
e js +  ; (5.4)
where s  s   Æ is the spoofer code delay error, s  s   Æ is the spoofer
carrier phase error,  fD;s  fD;s   ÆfD is the spoofer Doppler error and Rs¹sº is
the normalized cross-correlation function between C¹kTsº and Cs¹kTsº at lag s.
Therefore, during a spoofing attack, the correlator outputs are, in general, different
from the case where only the authentic signal is present.
Finally, let’s make some assumption on the spoofing scenario:
• No multipath.
• The attacker knows its position.
• The attacker knows the position of the victim and therefore he has knowledge
of the amplitude Aa, the code delay a and the Doppler frequency fD ;a. As
regards the phase a, we take into consideration two possibilities: one in which
the spoofer knows it, the other in which he don’t.
In order to formalize this assumption, the spoofer estimates the authentic signal
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that is received by the victim receiver as
r˜a¹tº  AaDa¹t   tp;aºCa¹t   aºe j»2¹ fIF+ fD;aºt+˜a¼ + na¹tº ; (5.5)
where
˜a 
{
a ; if the authentic phase is known ;
 U¹»0; 2¼º ; if the authentic phase is unknown ; (5.6)
while, as anticipated, all the other parameters of the authentic signal are assumed
known by the spoofer.
Finally, the attacks that we are going to investigate consider a lift-off-aligned approach,
in which the spoofer begins its attack with code and Doppler frequency aligned to
the authentic signal and then gradually modifies his parameters, namely As, s and
fD ;s, in order to take control of the victim receiver and lead it to the desired position.
5.2 A Trivial Attack
This attack considers the transmission of the signal of Eq. (5.2) with
Cs  Ca ; (5.7)
s 
{
a ; if the authentic phase is known ;
 U¹»0; 2¼º ; if the phase authentic is unknown ; (5.8)
that is a signal with the same PRN code as the authentic signal.
An example of this attack in given in Fig. 5.1 for a GPS and a Galileo signal. It
represents a snapshot of the in-phase correlator function of authentic, spoofing and
total signal during the lift-off phase of the attack. As can be seen, early, late and prompt
correlators assume a relative abnormal position with respect to that of an authentic
signal in Fig. 2.9. Signal quality monitoring techniques leverage this abnormality to
detect the spoofing attack, as we will se in the next section.
5.3 Signal Quality Monitoring Techniques
SQM techniques have long been employed to monitor the GPS correlation peak
quality in multipath fading environments. The interaction between spoofing and
authentic signals can affect the correlator output in a way similar to that of multipath
components. Therefore, reference [14] has extended the previously proposed SQM
techniques to detect spoofing attacks on tracking receivers working in LOS conditions.
Different metrics have been proposed in order to detect any abnormal asymmetry
and/or flatness of correlation peaks that is imposed by the interaction between
authentic and spoofing signals and are based on combining three or more correlator
outputs.
5.3.1 Metrics
There are various metrics proposed in the literature and a summary is provided here:
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(a) BPSK(1) signal. Correlator spacing d  0:8.
Authentic code delay a   0:7.
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(b) BOC(1,1) signal. Correlator spacing d  0:33.
Authentic code delay a   0:5.
Figure 5.1: Normalized correlation function of authentic, spoofing
and total signals for two differently modulated signals as a function
of . Early, late and prompt in-phase correlator outputs of the total
correlator function are also shown.
• Delta metric (DM). The delta metric is defined as [14]
 
I    I
I0
: (5.9)
It is based on the difference between the outputs of two correlators that are
symmetric with respect to the prompt correlator. Therefore, it is easy to see
that the mean value of  will tend to zero in a clean data set, and in case of
asymmetries,  will be a positive or a negative number, based on the delay
and phase of the spoofing signal.
• Double delta metric (DDM). The double delta metric is defined as [36]
1 ;2  1   2 
»I 1   I1¼   »I 2   I2¼
I0
; (5.10)
with 1 > 2. Initially introduced as a DLL discriminator for multipath
mitigation [37], this metric has been slightly modified as a proposal to provide
spoofing detection. It is computed as the difference between two DMs, leading
to a zero mean value in a clean data set.
• Ratio metric (RM). The ratio metric is defined as [14]
RA 
I  + I
I0
: (5.11)
Similarly to the DM, it is used to detect distortions of the correlation function; it
is based on observing the sum of early and late correlator, w.r.t. the prompt one.
• Asymmetric ratio metric (ARM). The asymmetric ratio metric is defined as [36]
ARA 
I
I0
; (5.12)
ARA  
I 
I0
; (5.13)
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where the first one can be called asymmetric late ratio metric (ALRM) and the
second one can be called asymmetric early ratio metric (AERM), according
to the type of correlator at the numerator. These metrics are used to detect a
flattened or a more pointed correlation peak, by looking to the ratio between an
early/late and the prompt correlation outputs.
• Early-late phase metric (ELPM). The early-late phase metric is defined as [38]
ELP  tan 1
(
Q
I
  Q 
I 
)
: (5.14)
This metric has been proposed for multipath detection for L1 and L2C signals. It
computes the phase difference between the early and late correlators. Moreover,
it is one of the only proposed signal quality metric to incorporate the quadrature
component in calculations.
• Magnitude difference metric (MDM). The magnitude difference metric is
defined as [13]
MD 
jS  j   jS j
jS0 j : (5.15)
This metric checks for symmetry like the DM, but operates with the CAF
magnitude instead, therefore making use also of the quadrature component.
Now we can compute the detection threshold for each metric in order to satisfy a
desired false alarm probability.
5.3.2 Detection thresholds
In general, the proposed metrics are functions of the correlator outputs, which are
Gaussian random variables whose statistics are calculated in Appendix B. Therefore,
we can write them in a general form as
Y  g¹X1 ; : : : ;XNº ; (5.16)
where Y is a generic metric and Xi , i  1; : : : ;N are generic in-phase or in-quadrature
correlator outputs. Their cumulative distribution function (CDF) can be derived
numerically with
FY¹yº  P
[
Y  y]
 P
[
g¹X1 ; : : : ;XNº  y
]

º
D
fX1 ;:::;XN ¹x1 ; : : : ; xNºdx1 : : : dxN ; (5.17)
where D 
{¹x1 ; : : : ; xNº j g¹x1 ; : : : ; xNº < y}. In order to find the probability density
function (PDF) of Y, it is sufficient to differentiate FY¹yº:
fY¹yº  dFY¹yºdy : (5.18)
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Finally, the upper and lower detection thresholds are calculated such that
P
[
Y < l
]

¹ l
 1
fY¹yºdy  Pfa2 ; (5.19)
P
[
Y > u
]

¹ 1
u
fY¹yºdy  Pfa2 ; (5.20)
where Pfa is the desired false alarm probability, which is defined as the probability
that the receiver reports the presence of spoofing, even if the signal is authentic. On
the other side, we can define the probability of detection Pd as the probability that
the receiver detects a spoofing signal when it is truly present.
5.4 Nulling Attack
An attack that is able to achieve optimal results against the signal quality monitoring
techniques described above is the nulling. Some hints about this attack have already
been given in Section 3.4: in a nutshell, it aims at reproducing in the victim receiver a
signal equal to the authentic signal that the victim would receive if he really was in
the spoofed location. This is done by superposing two signals:
• A replica of the authentic signal in phase opposition with it, leading to the
cancellation of the legit signal.
• An authentic-like signal with the parameters that leads the victim receiver to
the desired spoofing location.
Therefore, the mathematical formulation of the spoofing signal is
rs¹tº  r¯¹tº   r˜a¹tº ; (5.21)
where
r¯¹tº  AD¹t   tpºCa¹t   ºe j»2¹ fIF+ fDºt+¼ ; (5.22)
is the target total received signal where all the parameters are decided by the spoofer
in order to force the desired spoofing location.
An example of this attack in given in Fig. 5.2 for a GPS and a Galileo signal. As in
the trivial attack example, it represents a snapshot of the in-phase correlator function
of authentic, spoofing and total signal during the lift-off phase of the attack. As
anticipated, the total signal is an authentic-like signal where the authentic signal is
completely canceled out.
5.5 Optimal Attack
The aim of the attack is to make sure that the probability of detection of the spoofing
signal is the smallest possible. As seen above, an attack that is able to achieve great
results is the nulling attack. However, comparable performance can be obtained by
using a minor amount of energy. Indeed, instead of reproducing an entirely authentic-
like signal, why not spoof a signal that looks authentic only on the correlators which
are used for the tracking and for the SQMmetrics? The basic idea is to create a spoofing
signal with the minimum energy such that is “trackable” and which generates a SQM
metric value as close as possible to that of an authentic signal.
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Authentic code delay a   0:7.
−2 −1 0 1 2 3−2
0
2
∆τ [chips]
I
Authentic
Spoofing
Total
(b) BOC(1,1) signal. Correlator spacing d  0:33.
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Figure 5.2: Normalized correlation function of authentic, spoofing
and total signals for two differently modulated signals as a function
of . Early, late and prompt in-phase correlator outputs of the total
correlator function are also shown.
In order to give a mathematical formulation to the problem described above, in
some circumstances it is useful to think in the frequency domain. Therefore, the
Fourier transform notation of the signals involved in given in Table 5.1.
5.5.1 Constraints
There are three type of constraints on the signal that is received by the victim receiver:
• It must be tracked by the receiver, of course.
• The SQMmetric computed from it must assume values as close as possible to
the values generated by an authentic signal.
• Around the correlators, it must be seen as similar as possible to an authentic
signal by the receiver, such that a small lack of synchronization does not
compromise the attack.
These points are analyzed one by one in the following.
Trackability As a first requirement, the total signal received by the victim must be
tracked by the receiver. Given that every DLL discriminator watches at the unbalance
Table 5.1: Signals involved in the attack in their time and frequency
domain version.
Signal Time domain Frequency domain
Local replica (Eq. (2.11)) Ær¹tº ÆR¹ f º
Authentic signal estimate (Eq. (5.5)) r˜a¹tº R˜a¹ f º
Spoofing signal (Eq. (5.2)) rs¹tº Rs¹ f º
Total signal (Eq. (5.3)) r¹tº R¹ f º
CAF (Eq. (5.4)) S¹º S¹ f º
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between the in-phase CAF components at the early and late correlators (with distance
DLL chips from the prompt correlator), the conditions to be satisfied are
I DLL   IDLL  0 ;
Q DLL  0 ;
QDLL  0 ;
(5.23)
where the last two conditions must hold for those discriminators that use the in-
quadrature components for their code delay estimate.
Focusing on the first condition of Eq. (5.23), given that I  RefSg, it becomes
RefS DLLg   RefSDLLg  0 ; (5.24)
and switching to frequency domain we obtain
Re
{¹ Fs
0
S¹ f º
(
e  j2 f ¹ DLLºTc   e  j2 f DLLTc
)
d f
}
 0 ; (5.25)
where Fs  1Ts. Now, by the cross-correlation theorem S¹ f º  R¹ f º ÆR¹ f º, so
Eq. (5.25) can be written as
Re
{¹ Fs
0
R¹ f º ÆR¹ f º2 j sin (2 f DLLTc)d f }  0 ; (5.26)
where R¹ f º  R˜a¹ f º + Rs¹ f º, leading to
Re
{¹ Fs
0
(R˜a¹ f º + Rs¹ f º) ÆR¹ f º2 j sin (2 f DLLTc)d f }  0 : (5.27)
Now we write the above formula as
Re
{¹ Fs
0
Rs¹ f º ÆR¹ f º2 j sin
(
2 f DLLTc
)
d f
}
  Re
{¹ Fs
0
R˜a¹ f º ÆR¹ f º2 j sin
(
2 f DLLTc
)
d f
}
;
(5.28)
where we call
ÆRDLL¹ f º  ÆR¹ f º2 j sin (2 f DLLTc) ; (5.29)
bDLL   
¹ Fs
0
R˜a¹ f º ÆR¹ f º2 j sin
(
2 f DLLTc
)
d f ; (5.30)
so that Eq. (5.28) becomes
Re
{¹ Fs
0
Rs¹ f º ÆRDLL¹ f ºd f
}
 RefbDLLg ; (5.31)
which, finally, can be rewritten as
Re
{h ÆRDLL ;Rsi}  RefbDLLg ; (5.32)
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where h; i stands for the inner product in H2. Now, the last two conditions of
Eq. (5.23) must be considered, and, after some calculations they become{
Im
{h ÆRE;DLL ;Rsi}  ImfbE;DLLg ;
Im
{h ÆRL;DLL ;Rsi}  ImfbL;DLLg ; (5.33)
where
ÆRE;DLL¹ f º  ÆR¹ f ºe  j2 f ¹ DLLºTc ; (5.34)
bE;DLL   
¹ Fs
0
R˜a¹ f º ÆR¹ f ºe  j2 f ¹ DLLºTcd f (5.35)
and
ÆRL;DLL¹ f º  ÆR¹ f ºe  j2 f DLLTc ; (5.36)
bL;DLL   
¹ Fs
0
R˜a¹ f º ÆR¹ f ºe  j2 f DLLTcd f ; (5.37)
which concludes the constraints for the DLL discriminator.
Some DLL discriminator and all the PLL and FLL discriminators make use of the
prompt correlator, therefore we set a condition to ensure that it has only the in-phase
component: {
I0  A
Q0  0
, S0  A ; (5.38)
with A 2 R. Using similar calculations than those made above, the resulting condition
becomes:
h ÆRPLL ;Rsi  bPLL ; (5.39)
where
ÆRPLL¹ f º  ÆR¹ f º ; (5.40)
bPLL  A  
¹ Fs
0
R˜a¹ f º ÆR¹ f ºd f : (5.41)
Finally, Eqs. (5.32), (5.33) and (5.39) are the conditions such that the signal received by
the victim receiver is trackable.
SQM Metric Undetectability Among the features which the signal received by the
victim mush have, the second requirement is that its probability of detection should
be as close as possible to the probability of false alarm. In order to accomplish this, it
is sufficient to set
¹1   ºMa  M¹S SQM ; S0 ; SSQMº  ¹1 + ºMa ; (5.42)
where M is a generic metric among those presented in the previous section and it
is written as a function of the prompt, early and late correlators (the last two with
distance SQM chips from the prompt one). Moreover, Ma is the value that the metric
M assumes when the signal is authentic and it depends on the values assumed by
the autocorrelation function R on the SQM correlators. Finally,  is a parameter that
specify the precision with which we want to be close to the authentic metric value.
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Using similar calculations of those done in the tracking on Eq. (5.42), the constraints
for themetrics that depends only on the in-phase components of the correlator outputs
can be summarized in the common expression
 Re
{
h ÆRSQM ;Rsi
}
 Re
{
bSQM
}
; (5.43)
where ÆRSQM¹ f º and bSQM are different for everymetric and they are defined as follows:
• Delta metric:
ÆRSQM¹ f º  ÆR¹ f º
[
2 j sin
(
2 f SQMTc
)   ¹1  ºMa] ; (5.44)
bSQM   
¹ Fs
0
R˜a¹ f º ÆR¹ f º
[
2 j sin
(
2 f SQMTc
)   ¹1  ºMa] d f ; (5.45)
with
Ma 
R¹ SQMº   R¹SQMº
R¹0º : (5.46)
• Double delta metric:
ÆRSQM¹ f º  ÆR¹ f º
[
2 j sin
(
2 f 1;SQMTc
)
 2 j sin (2 f 2;SQMTc)   ¹1  ºMa] ; (5.47)
bSQM   
¹ Fs
0
R˜a¹ f º ÆR¹ f º
[
2 j sin
(
2 f 1;SQMTc
)
 2 j sin (2 f 2;SQMTc)   ¹1  ºMa] d f ; (5.48)
with
Ma 
[
R¹ 1;SQMº   R¹1;SQMº
]   [R¹ 2;SQMº   R¹2;SQMº]
R¹0º : (5.49)
• Ratio metric:
ÆRSQM¹ f º  ÆR¹ f º
[
2 cos
(
2 f SQMTc
)   ¹1  ºMa] ; (5.50)
bSQM   
¹ Fs
0
R˜a¹ f º ÆR¹ f º
[
2 cos
(
2 f SQMTc
)   ¹1  ºMa] d f ; (5.51)
with
Ma 
R¹ SQMº + R¹SQMº
R¹0º : (5.52)
• Asymmetric ratio metric (early correlator):
ÆRSQM¹ f º  ÆR¹ f º e  j2 f ¹ SQMºTc ; (5.53)
bSQM   
¹ Fs
0
R˜a¹ f º ÆR¹ f º
[
e  j2 f ¹ SQMºTc   ¹1  ºMa
]
d f ; (5.54)
with
Ma 
R¹ SQMº
R¹0º : (5.55)
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• Asymmetric ratio metric (late correlator):
ÆRSQM¹ f º  ÆR¹ f º e  j2 f SQMTc ; (5.56)
bSQM   
¹ Fs
0
R˜a¹ f º ÆR¹ f º
[
e  j2 f SQMTc   ¹1  ºMa
]
d f ; (5.57)
with
Ma 
R¹SQMº
R¹0º : (5.58)
As regards early-late phase and magnitude difference metrics, they are based on
non-linear combinations of the in-phase and in-quadrature components and therefore
they cannot included in our attack strategy. However, it must be said that in order to
mislead the ELPM, it would be sufficient for the spoofing signal to be in-phase with
the authentic signal. The same reasoning can be done with the MDM, with a further
condition that the in-phase correlators should satisfy the delta metric.
Authentic Signal Similarity In order for the spoofing signal to be robust to non-
perfect code delay synchronization with the authentic signal, we must ensure that the
slope of the correlation function around the in-phase correlator outputs of the total
received signal is equal to that of the authentic signal. In this way the value assumed
by the correlator outputs will be always within the regular range as if the signal was
authentic. The condition to accomplish this task is
dI¹º
d


 Da ; (5.59)
with
Da 
dR¹º
d


; (5.60)
where Da is the slope of the autocorrelation function R at the correlators of interest.
As usual, after some calculations Eq. (5.59) can be written as
Re
{h ÆRE;DER;i ;Rsi}  RefbE;DER;ig ; for i  DLL; SQM ; (5.61)
where
ÆRE;DER;i¹ f º  ÆR¹ f º
(
j2 f e  j2 f ¹ iºTc   Da
)
; (5.62)
bE;DER;i   
¹ Fs
0
R˜a¹ f º ÆR¹ f º
(
j2 f e  j2 f ¹ iºTc   Da
)
d f ; (5.63)
for early correlators and
Re
{h ÆRL;DER;i ;Rsi}  RefbL;DER;ig ; for i  DLL; SQM ; (5.64)
where
ÆRL;DER;i¹ f º  ÆR¹ f º
(
j2 f e  j2 f iTc   Da
)
; (5.65)
bL;DER;i   
¹ Fs
0
R˜a¹ f º ÆR¹ f º
(
j2 f e  j2 f iTc   Da
)
d f ; (5.66)
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for late correlators.
5.5.2 Optimization Problem
The energy of the spoofing signal is defined as
Es  hRs ;Rsi 
¹ Fs
0
Rs¹ f º2d f ; (5.67)
therefore the optimization problem can be written as
Rs¹ f º  arg min
Rs¹ f º
Es
s:t: Re
{h ÆRDLL ;Rsi}  RefbDLLg;
Im
{h ÆRE;DLL ;Rsi}  ImfbE;DLLg;
Im
{h ÆRL;DLL ;Rsi}  ImfbL;DLLg;
h ÆRPLL ;Rsi  bPLL ;
Re
{
h ÆR+SQM ;Rsi
}
 Re
{
b+SQM
}
;
 Re
{
h ÆR SQM ;Rsi
}
  Re
{
b SQM
}
;
Re
{h ÆRE;DER;i ;Rsi}  RefbE;DER;ig; i  DLL; SQM;
Re
{h ÆRL;DER;i ;Rsi}  RefbL;DER;ig; i  DLL; SQM;
(5.68)
where the first four constraints are relative to the trackability, the fifth and sixth
concern the undetectability and the last two ensure the right slope on the correlator
outputs.
The first step to solve this optimization problem is to derive an orthonormal basis
for the set of signals
B  f ÆRDLL¹ f º; ÆRE;DLL¹ f º; ÆRL;DLL¹ f º; ÆRPLL¹ f º; ÆR+SQM¹ f º; ÆR SQM¹ f º;
ÆRE;DER;i¹ f º; ÆRL;DER;i¹ f ºg ; i  DLL; SQM ;
(5.69)
and this can be done by applying the Graham-Schmidt orthonormalization procedure
to the above set, obtaining
ÆB  f ÆRi¹ f ºg ; i  1; : : : ; K ; (5.70)
that is a set of orthonormal functions of cardinality K  jBj, which we take as a basis
of a signal space. Since this basis is derived from B, all the functions in B belong to
the signal space generated by ÆB.
At this point, since all the constraints are in the form of inner products between the
functions of B and Rs¹ f º, we can state that the signal Rs¹ f º of minimum energy must
lie in the same signal space as the elements in B. This fact can be translated into
defining
Rs¹ f º 
KÕ
i1
ri ÆRi¹ f º ; (5.71)
that is, the spoofing signal can be written as a linear combination of the functions of
basis ÆB.
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From this fact, the energy of Rs¹ f º can be expressed as
Es 
KÕ
i1
jri j2d f : (5.72)
Moreover, leaving aside for the moment the Refg and Imfg operators, each equality
constraint can be rewritten as
KÕ
i1
ÆR?¹ f ºri ÆRi ¹ f º  b? ; (5.73)
where? is a placeholder for a specific signal of B. Using a matrix notation, the above
formula is equivalent to
[ ÆR?¹ f º ÆR1¹ f º    ÆR?¹ f º ÆRK¹ f º] 
r1
:::
rK
  b? : (5.74)
This is a complex linear equation, but now we have to deal with the fact that all but
one of the constraints are encapsulated in a Refg or Imfg operator. In order to solve
this problem, we exploit the matrix representation of a complex number, that is
x + j y $
[
x  y
y x
]
; (5.75)
which allows to reformulate Eq. (5.74) as
A?r  b? (5.76)
with
A? 
[
A?;RE
A?;IM
]
(5.77)

[
Re
{ ÆR1;?¹ f º}   Im{ ÆR1;?¹ f º}    Re{ ÆRK;?¹ f º}   Im{ ÆRK;?¹ f º}
Im
{ ÆR1;?¹ f º} Re{ ÆR1;?¹ f º}    Im{ ÆRK;?¹ f º} Re{ ÆRK;?¹ f º} ] ; (5.78)
r 

Refr1g
  Imfr1g
:::
RefrKg
  ImfrKg

; (5.79)
b? 
[
Refb?g
Imfb?g
]
; (5.80)
where ÆRi ;?¹ f º  ÆR?¹ f º ÆRi ¹ f º, i  1; : : : ; K. Now, we can extend this result to those
constraints that contain the Refg or Imfg operators. In particular, for the first ones
Eq. (5.76) becomes
A?;REr  b? ; (5.81)
and for the second ones Eq. (5.76) turns into
A?;IMr  b? ; (5.82)
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where A?;RE and A?;IM are defined in Eq. (5.77). Given that Eqs. (5.81) and (5.82) are
real equations, they can be extended to the inequality constraints.
Now, by using the results of Eqs. (5.72), (5.74), (5.81) and (5.82), we can reformulate
the optimization problem of Eq. (5.68) as
Rs¹ f º  arg min
r1 ; : : : ; rK
Es
s:t: ADLL;REr  bDLL ;
AE;DLL;IMr  bE;DLL ;
AL;DLL;IMr  bL;DLL ;
APLLr  bPLL ;
A+SQM;REr  b+SQM ;
 A SQM;REr   b SQM ;
AE;DER;REr  bE;DER;i ; i  DLL; SQM;
AE;DER;REr  bL;DER;i ; i  DLL; SQM;
(5.83)
where Rs¹ f º is the desired optimal spoofing signal that, in the time domain, becomes
rs¹tº  F  1»Rs¹ f º¼.

65
Chapter 6
Security Evaluation of the Signal
Quality Monitoring Techniques
All the plots shown in this Chapter are obtained through runningMatlab® scripts.
Unless otherwise indicated, the parameters that are used in the simulations are those
reported in Table 6.1. Moreover, in Fig. 6.1 the ACF of the BPSK(1) and BOC(1,1)
signals are represented; the BPSK(1) modulation is used in the GPS L1 C/A signal,
while the BOC(1,1) one is used in Galileo E1B/E1C signals in combination with the
BOC(6,1) modulation, therefore, it is trivial to extend the obtained results for the total
modulation. The default correlators that will be used are reported in Table 6.1.
As an example of how the proposed algorithm works, in Fig. 6.2 the in-phase
correlator outputs of the authentic, spoofing and total signals are represented in a
snapshot of the optimal attack with the default parameters for a GPS signal. As we
can see, the DLL correlators exhibit the same value, while the SQM correlators are
such the SQM metrics return a value that is the same as an authentic one. Moreover,
the slope of the correlation function around all the correlators is very similar to that
of a standard signal. In order to evaluate the performance of the SQM metrics, a
snapshot of a lift-off-aligned attack with the proposed optimal spoofing signal will
be considered and 106 attempts of the attack during this snapshot will be performed.
This strategy will be used to make three comparison between attacks by varying some
parameters of Table 6.1:
• Different authentic code delays a. We will see how the performance change
with respect to of the relative code delay distance between the authentic and
the spoofing signals.
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(a) BPSK(1) signal.
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Figure 6.1: Normalized ACF of the two signals that are used in the
simulations.
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• Comparison between different metric precisions . As  increases, we will
expect an improvement of the performance while the spoofer will be spending
less energy.
• Nulling and optimal attack with unknown authentic phase ˜a. We will see if
the nulling attack will remain better than the proposed attack.
The comparisons will be in terms of the receiver operating characteristic (ROC), that
is a graphical plot of the probability of detection against the probability of false alarm.
Moreover, the normalized energy of the spoofing and the total signal will be also
given and they will be useful to for the performance evaluation.
Finally, a simulation of a lift-off-aligned attack will be performed.
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Figure 6.2: Authentic, spoofing and total correlation function during
a snapshot of the optimal attack with default parameters (BPSK(1,1)
signal).
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Table 6.1: Default parameters.
Type Parameter Value
General
Number of
attempts 10
6 attempts
fIF 0 Hz
M 1
CN0 45 dB  Hz
Upsampling
factor
10
(for BPSK(1)) –
12
(for BOC(1,1))
Local replica
Ær¹tº (Eq. (2.11))
Æ 0 chip
ÆfD 0 Hz
Æ 0 rad
Authentic signal
ra¹tº (Eq. (5.1))
Aa 1
Da 1
Ca PRN 1
a  1 chip
fD;a 0 Hz
a 0 rad
Authentic signal estimate
r˜a¹tº (Eq. (5.5)) ˜a 0 rad
Total signal for nulling attack
r¯¹tº (Eq. (5.22))
A
(also for
optimal attack)
1.5
D 1
 0 chip
fD 0 Hz
 0 rad
DLL/PLL discriminator dDLL  dPLL
0:8 chip
(for BPSK(1)) –
0:33 chip
(for BOC(1,1))
SQM metric
dSQM
1:4 chip
(for BPSK(1)) –
0:5 chip
(for BOC(1,1))
dSQM;1
(only for double
delta metric)
1:8 chip
(for BPSK(1)) –
1 chip
(for BOC(1,1))
dSQM;2
(only for double
delta metric)
0:4 chip
(for BPSK(1)) –
0:167 chip
(for BOC(1,1))
 0
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6.1 Comparison between different authentic code delays
This Section provides a performance comparison of the SQM metrics between five
different authentic code delays: a  0; 0:5; 1; 1:5; 2. The results for the BPSK(1)
signal are reported in Fig. 6.3 and Table 6.2, while for the BOC(1,1) signal in Fig. 6.4
and Table 6.3.
First of all, we can see that for a  0, the probability of false alarm and the
probability of detection coincide, which means the total signal is an ideal authentic-
like signal. Moreover, the energy used by the spoofer and the energy of the total
received signal is pretty similar for all themetrics. From these two facts, it is reasonable
to assume that the spoofing signal is almost equal for all the metrics.
Secondly, we can notice from the ROCs that the performance increases as the
relative delay between authentic and spoofing signal increases for all the metrics.
In order to explain this behavior, we should recall that the thresholds used by the
receiver to detect spoofing are a function of the desired probability of false alarm and
of the probability density function of the metric. The metric PDF, in turn, depends
on the correlator values which are a function of CN0, leading the thresholds to be
themselves a function of CN0. In particular, as the carrier-to-noise ratio increases,
the thresholds narrow toward the authentic metric value, and vice versa.
Now, from Tables 6.2 and 6.3 we can see that, for an increasing ja j also the total
energy grows, leading to a higher CN0 and thus to a narrowing of the thresholds.
However, as we can see from the example in Fig. 6.2, the correlator values remain in a
range corresponding to that of an authentic signal of power less than the actual total
signal, but the thresholds are set for an authentic signal with the power of the total
signal, and thus with higher correlator values, that is, with a different metric PDF.
Moreover, we can notice thatwith a   1:5; 2 for BPSK(1) andwith a   1; 1:5; 2
for BOC(1,1) the performance are pretty the same, and this can be viewed as a sort
of saturation of the performance for relative delays between spoofing and authentic
signals higher than ja j  2. This is because, at this point, the authentic signal is no
longer contributing to the correlators of the receiver and, therefore, the shape of the
spoofing signal can remain constant.
Moreover, in order to compare the results for the various metrics, we can notice
that the performance are quite similar. There are only a couple of outliers, one for
each constellation.
For the BPSK(1) signal, we can see that the asymmetric late ratio metric reaches the
saturation performance already for a   1:5; 2. This behavior can interpreted
noting that the late correlator is in the opposite side of the “direction” of the authentic
signal and, therefore, it is no more influenced by the spoofing signal earlier than the
other correlators and this affect the performance of the metric, that is mainly based
on it.
For what concern the outlier between the BOC(1,1) results, the performance of the
double delta metric for a  0 are unpredictably good. This should be dued to
a numerical approximation error in doing the derivatives in a discrete frequency
domain and it will have to be handled at best.
Finally, to make a comparison between the BPSK and BOC modulations, we can
see that the performance are very similar. The main difference is that the performance
of the BOC(1,1) signal saturate at a lower ja j than the BPSK(1) signal. This can be
explained by the fact that the correlators of the BOC(1,1) signal have a smaller spacing
between them, and therefore the interference with the authentic signal disappear
earlier.
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Table 6.2: Spoofing and total energy for different authentic code delays
(BPSK(1) signal).
Es | E
Authentic code delay a [chips]
0 -0.5 -1 -1.5 -2
DM 0.26 | 2.26 1.51 | 2.51 2.58 | 2.93 2.31 | 3.19 2.26 | 3.26
DDM 0.27 | 2.27 1.55 | 2.51 2.73 | 2.81 2.37 | 3.14 2.28 | 3.27
RM 0.26 | 2.26 1.63 | 2.39 2.72 | 2.77 2.29 | 3.20 2.26 | 3.26
AERM 0.25 | 2.25 1.61 | 2.40 2.82 | 2.67 2.33 | 3.17 2.26 | 3.25
ALRM 0.25 | 2.25 1.56 | 2.46 2.44 | 3.08 2.26 | 3.25 2.26 | 3.25
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Figure 6.3: ROC for different authentic code delays (BPSK(1) signal).
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Table 6.3: Spoofing and total energy for different authentic code delays
(BOC(1,1) signal).
Es | E
Authentic code delay a [chips]
0 -0.5 -1 -1.5 -2
DM 0.28 | 2.28 4.21 | 2.86 2.33 | 3.23 2.28 | 3.28 2.28 | 3.28
DDM 0.99 | 2.99 5.21 | 3.20 3.29 | 3.82 3.08 | 3.98 2.98 | 3.99
RM 0.29 | 2.29 4.27 | 2.79 2.42 | 3.16 2.28 | 3.29 2.28 | 3.29
AERM 0.28 | 2.28 4.22 | 2.83 2.41 | 3.17 2.28 | 3.28 2.28 | 3.28
ALRM 0.28 | 2.28 4.14 | 2.94 2.33 | 3.23 2.28 | 3.28 2.28 | 3.28
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Figure 6.4: ROC for different authentic code delays (BOC(1,1) signal).
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6.2 Comparison between different metric precisions
This Section provides a performance comparison of the SQM metrics between six
different metric precisions:   0; 0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4; 0:5. The results for the BPSK(1)
signal are reported in Fig. 6.5 and Table 6.4. The delta metric and the double delta
metric are not present; indeed, the extremes of the range in which the values of the
metric should stay are ¹1 ºMa (see Eq. (5.42)), where Ma is the value that the metric
assumes when the signal is authentic and it depends on the values assumed by the
ACF on the SQM correlators. Therefore, since for the DM and the DDM Ma  0, both
the extremes would be equal to Ma, leading to the same result as   0.
The main result that stands out from the ROCs is that the all the three metrics
gain in performance as  increases because the spoofing signal is using less energy
making a compromise on his detectability.
Table 6.4: Spoofing and total energy for different metric precisions
(BPSK(1) signal).
Es | E
Metric precision 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
DM 2.72 | 2.77 2.58 | 2.93 2.58 | 2.93 2.58 | 2.93 2.58 | 2.93 2.58 | 2.93
DDM 2.58 | 2.93 2.73 | 2.81 2.73 | 2.81 2.73 | 2.81 2.73 | 2.81 2.73 | 2.81
RM 2.72 | 2.77 2.65 | 2.78 2.59 | 2.80 2.54 | 2.84 2.51 | 2.88 2.48 | 2.94
AERM 2.48 | 2.94 2.75 | 2.68 2.69 | 2.69 2.93 | 2.71 2.58 | 2.74 2.54 | 2.78
ALRM 2.54 | 2.78 2.41 | 3.09 2.40 | 3.10 2.39 | 3.13 2.39 | 3.13 2.39 | 3.13
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Figure 6.5: ROC for different metric precisions (BPSK(1) signal).
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Table 6.5: Spoofing and total energy with unknown authentic phase
(BPSK(1) signal).
E¯s | E¯ Optimal Nulling
DM 2.58 | 3.58
3.25 | 4.25
DDM 2.73 | 3.73
RM 2.74 | 3.75
AERM 2.42 | 3.41
ALRM 2.84 | 3.86
6.3 Comparison between nulling and optimal attack with un-
known authentic phase
This Section provides a performance comparison of the SQMmetrics between nulling
and the proposed attack with unknown authentic phase. In order to evaluate
the performance for this scenario, the two attacks have been performed for ˜a 
0; 4; 2; 34;  (the three remaining angles to complete the trigonometric circle
are not considered due to symmetry) and then the mean of the probability of detection
and of the energies has been taken. A dense angular sampling was not considered, to
save computational time. The results for the BPSK(1) signal are reported in Fig. 6.7
and Table 6.5.
First of all, we can notice that in this scenario the performance of the SQMmetrics
increases drastically, as expected. Indeed, not knowing the authentic phase is a
realistic as much as a dramatic disadvantage for the attacker, because this means that
he must try a random phase.
Another thing that stands out is that the performance are quite different for the
various metrics, at least lingering over the shape of the curves. Actually, the only
metric which differs substantially to the worse from the others is the delta metric.
Secondly, to make a comparison between optimal and nulling attacks, we can see
that in three of five cases (double delta, ratio and asymmetric early ratio metrics) the
nulling one performs better, in one case (delta metric) the optimal does better and in
the last case (asymmetric late ratio metric) they split the victory. However, in all the
cases the optimal attack utilizes less energy.
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Figure 6.6: ROC with unknown authentic phase (BPSK(1) signal)
(continued).
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Figure 6.7: ROC with unknown authentic phase (BPSK(1) signal)
(continued).
6.4 Simulation of a lift-off-aligned attack
This final Section attempts to give the reader an idea of how a lift-off-aligned attack
is performed, without any pretense to be a realistic simulation. In this context, the
evolution of the prompt correlator value A and of the authentic code delay a is
represented in Fig. 6.8 as a function of time. Moreover, it has to be specified that
a metric precision of   0:1 has been used in order to give a little more freedom
to the attacker to see what will be his behavior. Finally, a probability of false alarm
Pfa  10 2 has been set. The resulting attack is reported in Fig. 6.9.
First being all, from the evolution of A and a we can deduce that the spoofer
starts his attack aligned to the victim, while he is increasing the prompt correlator
value. Then, at a certain point A stabilize to a constant value while the lift-off phase
begins, with the spoofing signal moving away from the authentic signal.
As a second step, we can analyze the metrics’ evolution. We can notice that the
thresholds change as the attack moves on, allowing us to realize that the CN0 also
changes. Moreover, some metric has some variations of his mean value, which signify
that the attacker is taking advantage of the degrees of liberty given by the metric
precision. Finally, given that the attack is composed by 2000 time steps, we can see
that the empirical values of the metrics go beyond the thresholds with a probability
very similar (a little worse, as expected) to the fixed Pfa  10 2.
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Figure 6.8: Evolution of the amplitude of the prompt correlator and
the authentic code delay for the lift-off-aligned attack.
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Figure 6.9: Simulation of a lift-off-aligned attack (BPSK(1) signal)
(continued).
75
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
Spoofing attack on GNSS receivers has been considered as a serious threat to safety of
life applications; since there is enoughmotivation for illicit application of spoofers, the
realization of spoofers is not prohibitively costly. As such, it is anticipated that many
research activities will be conducted on increasing the security of GNSS receivers
against spoofing and jamming attacks.
In this Thesis different spoofing/anti-spoofing scenarios were described and the
vulnerabilities of GNSS that can potentially be exploited by a spoofer were discussed.
Moreover, an optimal attack against the anti-spoofing SQM techniques has been
proposed; in particular, a mathematical model has been developed in order to derive
the spoofing signal that the spoofer has to transmit to the victim to take the control of
his receiver. We have seen that the proposed algorithm generate a spoofing signal that
passes the SQM defence with low probability of detection; indeed, it satisfies three
main constraints: the DLL correlator outputs of the total signal received by the victim
are at the same height, leading to a smooth tracking process; the SMQ correlator
outputs of the total received signal are such that the value of the SQM metrics is
authentic-like; finally, the slope around all the correlator outputs is similar to that of
an authentic signal, providing robustness against minor code delay misalignments.
Finally, the security evaluations of the SQM techniques against the proposed attack
has been provided, showing that the total received signal is reported as a spoofed
signal with a probability of detection not much higher than the probability of false
alarm set by the receiver for an authentic signal. In particular, the only thing that
helps the receiver to realize that a spoofing attack is going on is that CN0 is high in
relation to the value of the correlator outputs. However, we have also seen that, if the
attacker does not know the phase of th authentic signal, the security performance of
the SQM techniques increases drastically, as expected for such a scenario.
For what concern the future work, the SQM defense and the proposed attack
should be implemented on a realistic testbed in order to understand if the performance
evaluated in simulation will be confirmed.
Secondly, an improvement of the SQM techniques should be considered. In particular,
the detection mechanism should be developed as a composite hyphotesis test, such as
the GLRT, that permits to consider a wide class of attacks in the calculation of the
detection thresholds. Another possibility should be to combine more than one metric
in the statistical test, with a view to leave the attacker with less degrees of freedom in
choosing the structure of the spoofing signal.
Moreover, it should be resolved the main limitation of the SQM techniques, that is,
they are actually not able to discriminate between spoofing and multipath; indeed,
both signals generates similar effects on the correlator outputs. One possibility is to
leverage the fact that the multipath components generally have smaller amplitude
that the authentic signal from which they are generated and that they are always
late with respect to it. Specifically, a composite hypothesis test should be realized in
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which there are multiple alternate hypothesizes: spoofing, multipath and spoofing
together with multipath.
Finally, the SQM techniques should be combined with different anti-spoofing that
works on other blocks of the receiver in order to provide security on more levels, that
is, in a multilayer perspective.
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Appendix A
Relation between C/N0 and
pre-correlation noise power
At the output of the front-end, a complex GNSS signal for a single satellite can be
modeled as
r¹k; ; ; fD ;Aº  AD¹kTs   ºC¹kTs   ºe j»2¹ fIF+ fDºkTs+¼ + n¹kTsº ; (A.1)
where Ts is the sampling time interval and fIF is the intermediate frequency (IF) at
which the signal is down-converted by the front end. Moreover, D is the navigation
data symbol sequence, C is the spreading code sequence with a chip duration of
Tc and n is the noise. Finally, A is the signal amplitude,  is the code delay, fD is
the carrier Doppler frequency shift and  is the carrier-phase delay. For the sake of
simplicity, the dependency of the various functions on ; ; fD and Awill be dropped.
The noise term, called thermal noise, is induced by the antenna and the front-end
themselves and it is assumed to be and additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) [39].
Therefore, each sample can be modeled as a complex Gaussian random variable
n  CN (0; 2n ) ; (A.2)
with zero mean and variance 2n and it is independent and identically distribute w.r.t
the other samples.
The navigation data symbols D can be written in Cartesian form as D  DI + jDQ,
whereDI andDQ are the in-phase and quadrature components, respectively. Similarly,
the noise can be written in its baseband representation, that is n  nI + jnQ, where
each component is a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance
2nI  
2
nQ 
2n
2 : (A.3)
Using the notation with baseband components, the signal in Eq. (A.1) can be written
as
r¹kº  A¹DI¹kº + jDQ¹kººC¹kºe j¹kº + nI¹kº + jnQ¹kº ; (A.4)
where ¹kº  2¹ fIF+ fDºkTs+. This results in the following in-phase andquadrature
branches:
rI¹kº  ADI¹kºC¹kº cos¹¹kºº   ADQ¹kºC¹kº sin¹¹kºº + nI¹kº ; (A.5)
rQ¹kº  ADI¹kºC¹kº sin¹¹kºº + ADQ¹kºC¹kº cos¹¹kºº + nQ¹kº : (A.6)
The power of the baseband signals DI and DQ multiplied by the spreading code C is
equal to 1 because they are based on binary waveforms of amplitude 1. Therefore,
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the power of an I/Q component of the useful signal is [39]
PDI  PDQ 
A2
2 ; (A.7)
leading to a total power per branch of
PrI  PrQ  PDI + PDQ  A
2 : (A.8)
On the other hand, the noise power is [39]
2n  N0Bs  N0
1
Ts
; (A.9)
where N0 is the noise power density and Bs is the bandwidth of the signal at the
front-end output.
From Eqs. (A.7) and (A.9), the relation between CN0 and the complex noise power is
given by
CN0  PrIN0 
A2
2nTs

A2
22nITs
: (A.10)
Obviously, if the received signal has only the in-phase component DI, the power to be
used in the above formula is PI, resulting in CN0  A2¹22nTsº.
Finally, in order to derive the relation of the noise power with the SNR at the output
of the front-end, it is sufficient to divide CN0 by the bandwidth of the signal Bs.
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Statistics of the correlator output
The correlator output whose delay is  chips from the prompt one can be written as
S  ADR¹ + º sinc ¹ fDTcohºe j¹+ fDTcohº +  (B.1)
where      Æ is the code delay error,      Æ is the carrier phase error and
 fD  fD   ÆfD is the Doppler error. Moreover, R¹º is the ACF of C¹kTsº at lag 
and  is the noise after the correlation operation. In Eq. (B.1) the sinc function is
defined as sinc¹xº  sin¹xº¹xº.
The noise can be modeled as a complex Gaussian random variable
  CN
(
0; 2
)
; (B.2)
with zero mean and variance 2 and it is independent and identically distribute w.r.t
the other samples.
The navigation data symbols D can be written in Cartesian form as D  DI + jDQ,
whereDI andDQ are the in-phase and quadrature components, respectively. Similarly,
the noise can be written in its baseband representation, that is   I + jQ , where
each component is a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance
2I  
2
Q

2
2 : (B.3)
Using the notation with baseband components, the signal in Eq. (B.1) can be written
as
S  A¹DI¹kº + jDQ¹kººR¹ + º sinc¹ fDTcohºe j¹+ fDTcohº + I + jQ ; (B.4)
Therefore, the in-phase and quadrature components of the CAF are given by
I  ADIR¹ + º sinc¹ fDTcohº cos
(
 +  fDTcoh
)
  ADQR¹ + º sinc¹ fDTcohº sin
(
 +  fDTcoh
)
+ I ;
(B.5)
Q  ADIR¹ + º sinc¹ fDTcohº sin
(
 +  fDTcoh
)
+ ADQR¹ + º sinc¹ fDTcohº cos
(
 +  fDTcoh
)
+ Q :
(B.6)
Assuming a perfect synchronization between the receiver and the received signal, the
I/Q components becomes
I  ADIR¹º + I ; (B.7)
Q  ADQR¹º + Q : (B.8)
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The post-correlation noise  referred to a correlator of delay  can be written as a
function of the pre-correlation noise n, that is
 
1
M
MÕ
k1
n¹kº Ær¹kº

1
M
MÕ
k1
n¹kºC¹kTs   Æºe  j»2¹ fIF+ ÆfDºkTs+ Æ¼ (B.9)
and so its two components can be written as
I 
1
M
MÕ
k1
[
nI¹kº cos ( Æ¹kº) + nQ¹kº sin ( Æ¹kº) ] C¹kTs   Æº ; (B.10)
Q 
1
M
MÕ
k1
[
nI¹kº sin ( Æ¹kº)   nQ¹kº cos ( Æ¹kº) ] C¹kTs   Æº ; (B.11)
The expected value of the I/Q components of a correlator output with delay  is
I  E »I¼  E
[
ADIR¹º + I
]
 ADIR¹º ; (B.12)
Q  E »Q¼  E
[
ADQR¹º + Q
]
 ADQR¹º : (B.13)
The covariance between two I/Q correlators of delay i and  j is
2Ii ;I j
 E
[(
Ii   Ii
) (
I j   I j
)]
 E
[
Ii I j
]
 E
[(
1
M
MÕ
k1
[
nI¹kº cos ( Æ¹kº) + nQ¹kº sin ( Æ¹kº) ] C¹kTs   Æi º)

(
1
M
MÕ
k1
[
nI¹kº cos ( Æ¹kº) + nQ¹kº sin ( Æ¹kº) ] C¹kTs   Æ j º)]
 E
[
1
M2
MÕ
k1
[
nI¹kº cos ( Æ¹kº) + nQ¹kº sin ( Æ¹kº) ]2 C¹kTs   Æi ºC¹kTs   Æ j º]

1
M2
MÕ
k1
[
E
[
n2I ¹kº
]
cos2
( Æ¹kº) + E [n2Q¹kº] sin2 ( Æ¹kº) ] C¹kTs   Æi ºC¹kTs   Æ j º

1
M2
2nIMR¹
i    j º

2nI
M
R¹i    j º ; (B.14)
2Qi ;Q j

2nQ
M
R¹i    j º ; (B.15)
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where it has been exploited the fact that the noise samples are i.i.d. The covariance
between an in-phase correlator of delay i and a quadrature correlator of delay  j is
2Ii ;Q j
 E
[(
Ii   Ii
) (
Q j   Q j
)]
 E
[
Ii Q j
]
 E
[(
1
M
MÕ
k1
[
nI¹kº cos ( Æ¹kº) + nQ¹kº sin ( Æ¹kº) ] C¹kTs   Æi º)

(
1
M
MÕ
k1
[
nI¹kº sin ( Æ¹kº)   nQ¹kº cos ( Æ¹kº) ] C¹kTs   Æ j º)]

1
M2
MÕ
k1
[
E
[
n2I ¹kº
]
cos
( Æ¹kº) sin ( Æ¹kº)   E [n2Q¹kº] sin ( Æ¹kº) cos ( Æ¹kº) ]
 C¹kTs   Æi ºC¹kTs   Æ j º

1
M2
MÕ
k1
[
E
[
n2I ¹kº
]   E [n2Q¹kº] ] cos ( Æ¹kº) sin ( Æ¹kº)
 C¹kTs   Æi ºC¹kTs   Æ j º
 0 ; (B.16)
2Qi ;Q j
 0 ; (B.17)
Finally, this Thesis assumes real navigation data symbols, that is D  DI, permitting
us to consider only the in-phase components of the CAF in the above calculations.
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Appendix C
Relation between C/N0 and
post-correlation noise power
Starting from Eqs. (B.7) and (B.8), the power of the baseband signals DI and DQ is
equal to 1 because they are based on binary waveforms of amplitude 1. Therefore,
the power of an I/Q component of the useful signal is
PI  PQ  A
2R2¹º : (C.1)
On the other hand, the noise power is
2n  N0Bcoh  N0
1
Tcoh
; (C.2)
where N0 is the noise power density and Bcoh is the bandwidth of the signal at the
correlator output.
From Eqs. (C.1) and (C.2), the relation between CN0 and the complex noise power is
given by
CN0  PIN0 
A2R2¹º
2Tcoh

A2R2¹º
22ITcoh
: (C.3)
Finally, in order to derive the relation of the noise power with the SNR at the output
of the front-end, it is sufficient to divide CN0 by the bandwidth of the signal Bcoh.
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